Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S. PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY 1 ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM 2 Private Attorney General 3 c/o 40960 California Oaks Road 4 Box 281 1 2005 MAR 30 A 8: 47 5 Murrieta 92562 6 CALIFORNIA, USA 7 8 In Propriae Personae 9 10 All Rights Reserved without Prejudice 11 12 13 14 15 District Court of the United States 16 17 Central Judicial District of California 18 19 Southern Division 20 21 The People of California) No. SA CV 02-0382 GLT(ANx) 22 23 ex relatione Gayle Bybee et al., 2.4 25 Plaintiffs, 26 27 v. 28 29 Andrew Erath et al., 30 31 Defendants. 32) APPLICATION FOR ORDER DISSOLVING 33 United States) THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE: 34 ex relatione Paul Andrew Mitchell,) 18 U.S.C. 1964(a); 35) Lanham Act, Section 43(a); and, 36) Sherman Act (1890): 37 Intervenor. Lawful Jury Demanded. 38 COMES NOW the United States (hereinafter "Intervenor") ex relatione 39 Paul Andrew Mitchell, Citizen of ONE OF the United States of America, 40 qualified Federal Witness and Private Attorney General (hereinafter 41 "Relator"), to petition this honorable Court for a prompt ORDER 42 permanently dissolving the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") pursuant 43 to the authority conferred upon this Court by 18 U.S.C. 1964(a), by 44 the Lanham Act, and by the Sherman Act, and to provide formal written 45 46 Notice to all interested party(s) of same.

INCORPORATION OF EVIDENTIARY DOCUMENT 1 For the convenience of this honorable Court, and to minimize 2 Relator's mounting clerical and postage expenses, the United States 3 refers this Court to the following Internet URL and incorporates same 4 by reference, as if set forth fully here, to wit: 5 http://www.ustreas.gov/irs/ci/tax fraud/docnonfilers.htm 7 If this Court should so order, the United States will oblige by serving certified hard copies of the above document on all interested 8 parties and on the Clerk of this Court. See PROOF OF SERVICE infra. 9 In a section headed by the phrase "Just the Facts:" [sic], the 10 above document makes the following false statement: 11 The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) was established on July 1, 12 1862, by an act of Congress. 13 14 [bold emphasis added] 15 16 The United States contests this statement, in part by reference to footnote 23 in the published opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court in 17 Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, fn. 23 (1979). 18 The United States hereinafter relies upon said footnote formally 19 20 to refute the false statement quoted above. 21 Moreover, no one should be punished unnecessarily for relying upon the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. U.S. v. Mason, 412 U.S. 22 391, 399-400 (1973). Relator's research corroborates footnote 23. 23 24 The formal record now before this Court leaves absolutely no IRS was never created by any Act of Congress. 25 doubt that the Specifically, on July 9, 1953, Secretary of the Treasury G. K. 26 Humphrey changed the name of the Bureau of the Internal Revenue 27

Application for ORDER Dissolving the Internal Revenue Service:

Page 2 of 13

Treasury Order 150-06. This was his infamous "flick of the pen."

("BIR") to "Internal Revenue Service" when he signed what is now

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2	TRUE	ORIGINS	OF	THE	INTERNAL	REVENUE	SERV	/ICE

Pursuant to the Commerce Clause and the Lanham Act at 60 Stat.

440 (uncodified at 15 U.S.C. 1121), this honorable Court also has original jurisdiction to adjudicate regulation of interstate commerce, and to enjoin and sanction any and all of the following:

- (1) false designations of the origins of the tradenames and trademarks of articles and organizations operating in interstate commerce;
- (2) false and misleading descriptions of fact in connection with the tradenames and trademarks of articles and organizations operating in commerce; and,
- (3) false and misleading representations of fact in connection with the tradenames and trademarks of articles and organizations operating in commerce.

This Court is also authorized by the Lanham Act to impose a sanction of treble (triple) damages against the IRS <u>and</u> its principals, for its deliberately false designations of its own origins, for its deliberately false and misleading descriptions of fact, and for its deliberately false and misleading representations of fact in connection with the administration of the federal income tax throughout the United States of America, the District of Columbia, U.S. Possessions and Territories, and all federal enclaves.

One legislative intent of the Lanham Act is to protect the public from false designations of origin, from false and misleading descriptions of fact, and from false and misleading representations of fact in matters of interstate commerce. See <u>Follett v. Arbor House</u> Publishing Co., 497 F.Supp 304, 313, 208 USPQ 604, for example.

There is no question that the IRS is engaged in interstate commerce. See all Agreements on Coordination of Tax Administration as consummated with the taxing agencies of the 50 States, for example.

AS AN ALIAS FOR TRUST #62 IN PUERTO RICO, IRS ALSO VIOLATES THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT

The verified record now before this honorable Court, and numerous other State and federal courts, makes it very clear that the IRS, as we know it today, is actually an alias for Trust #62. See 31 U.S.C. 1321(a)(62). This trust is presently domiciled in Puerto Rico, under color of the former Federal Alcohol Administration ("FAA").

In the present context the following paragraph is a crucial point of fact that remains unrebutted by IRS officials and the Congress:

FAA becomes BIR

United States Code Service, Section 903, the Federal Alcohol Administration, and offices of members and Administrator thereof, were abolished and their functions directed to be administered under direction and supervision of the Secretary of the Treasury through the Bureau of Internal Revenue. We found this history in all of the older editions of 27 U.S.C.S., Section 201. It has been removed from current editions. Only two Bureaus of Internal Revenue have ever existed: one in the Philippines and another in Puerto Rico. Events that have transpired tell us that the Federal Alcohol Administration was absorbed by the Puerto Rico Trust #62.

["BATF/IRS -- Criminal Fraud," by William Cooper]
[Veritas, Issue Number 6, September 1995]

The United States argues that the prohibited monopoly practices systematically inflicted upon the American People by the IRS do blatantly violate the Sherman Antitrust Act, calling for appropriate judicial review, immediate oversight and timely relief from the concomitant restraint of trade. See Attachment "A" infra.

As a threshold matter, IRS Agreements on Coordination of Tax Administration ("ACTA") were consummated without the competitive bidding that is a legal requirement for service contracts issued by the governments of the several States. IRS is a monopoly enterprise.

Those ACTA agreements are also demonstrably fraudulent.

1	The United States argues and hereby offers to prove that ACTA
2	agreements falsely designate IRS as an agency of the U.S. Department
3	of the Treasury. In Section 2 entitled "Definitions" in the IRS
4	template for its ACTA agreements, yet another false statement is made:
5 6 7 8	The term "IRS" means the Internal Revenue Service, U.S. Department of Treasury. [bold emphasis added]
9	See 5 U.S.C. 551(1)(C), in chief, and the following Internet URL:
10	http://www.supremelaw.org/rsrc/acta/30455c.htm#template
11	(If this Court should so order, the United States will oblige by
12	serving certified hard copies of the above document on all interested
13	parties and on the Clerk of this Court. See PROOF OF SERVICE infra.)
14	It necessarily follows that IRS is perpetrating, under color of
15	official right, a variety of monstrous monopoly practices that are
16	expressly prohibited by the Sherman Act of 1890, as amended.
17	The Sherman Act also confers original jurisdiction upon this
18	honorable District Court of the United States ("DCUS"). See the
19	detailed elaboration of this point at the following Internet URL:
20	http://www.supremelaw.org/cc/microsoft/index.htm
21	(If this Court should so order, the United States will oblige by
22	serving certified hard copies of the above referenced documents on all
23	interested parties and on the Clerk of this Court.)
24	See Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 36 Stat. 1167 (1911); and
25	62 Stat. 909 (1948). This DCUS does enjoy original jurisdiction.
26	All guarantees of the U.S. Constitution were expressly extended
27	into the District of Columbia in 1871 and all federal Territories in
28	1873. See 16 Stat. 419, 426, Sec. 34; 18 Stat. 325, 333, Sec. 1891,
29	respectively. The Downes Doctrine is, therefore, ultra vires.

Application for ORDER Dissolving the Internal Revenue Service: Page 5 of 13 $\,$

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Those ACTA agreements are also demonstrably fraudulent.

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[bold emphasis added]

1 INCORPORATION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENTS

The United States hereby attaches a true and correct copy of the
Press Release entitled "Let's Dismantle IRS: This Racket is Busted,"
by Paul Andrew Mitchell, Relator in the instant case, and incorporates
same by reference to Attachment "A" infra, as if set forth fully here.

See Internet URL:

http://www.supremelaw.org/press/rels/dismantle.irs.htm
All URL's listed at the end of Attachment "A" are also incorporated.

REMEDIES REQUESTED

All premises having been duly considered, Intervenor respectfully petitions this honorable District Court of the United States ("DCUS"), Central Judicial District of California, Southern Division, for:

- (1) an ORDER liberally construing the RICO laws and permanently dissolving the RICO enterprise known as the Internal Revenue Service, pursuant to the original jurisdiction conferred upon this Court by the federal statute at 18 U.S.C. 1964(a), for its systematic, deliberate and premeditated historical violations of the Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), the Lanham Act first enacted in the year 1946 A.D., and also the Sherman Antitrust Act first enacted in the year 1890 A.D.; and,
- (2) all other relief which this honorable Court deems just and proper, under the full range of relevant historical circumstances which have occasioned the instant application, including but not limited to court-ordered sanctions calculated to multiply seven-fold the actual damages caused by the IRS and its responsible principals (i.e., actual + 3X RICO + 3X Lanham Act).
- Respondeat superior. Vicarious liability is actionable here.

1	VERIFICATION
2	I, Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris, hereby verify, under penalty
3	of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without
4	the "United States" (federal government), that the above statement of
5	facts and laws is true and correct, according to the best of My
6	current information, knowledge, and belief, so help me God, pursuant
7	to 28 U.S.C. 1746(1). See Supremacy Clause (Constitution, Laws and
8	Treaties are all the supreme Law of the Land throughout America).
9 10 11 12 13	Dated: June 1, 2002 A.D.
14 15	Signed: /s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell
16	Printed: Paul Andrew Mitchell, Private Attorney General

1	PROOF OF SERVICE
2	I, Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris, hereby certify, under penalty of
3	perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without the
4	"United States" (federal government), that I am at least 18 years of
5	age, a Citizen of ONE OF the United States of America, and that I
6	personally served the following document(s):
7 8 9 10 11 12	APPLICATION FOR ORDER DISSOLVING THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE: 18 U.S.C. 1964(a); Lanham Act, Section 43(a); and, Sherman Act (1890): Lawful Jury Demanded
14	by placing one true and correct copy of said document(s) in first
15	class United States Mail, with postage prepaid and properly addressed
16	to the following:
17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27	Clerk of Court (3x) District Court of the United States Central Judicial District of California Southern Division 411 West Fourth Street, Room 1-053 Santa Ana 92701-4516 CALIFORNIA, USA Gayle Bybee c/o Marcia J. Brewer 300 Corporate Pointe, Suite 330
28 29 30	Culver City 90230 CALIFORNIA, USA
31 32 33 34 35	Carla Figaro 21213-B Hawthorne Blvd., #5361 Torrance 90503 CALIFORNIA, USA
36 37 38 39	Nora Moore 8400 Edinger Avenue, Apt. #Z-106 Huntington Beach 92647 CALIFORNIA, USA
40 41 42 43 44	Denise Ricca-White 4805 Glenhaven Drive Oceanside 92056 CALIFORNIA, USA

1	Andrew Erath
2	c/o Office of Regional Inspector
3	Internal Revenue Service
4	P.O. Box 6238
5	Laguna Niguel 92607
6	CALIFORNIA, USA
7	
8	Erik Newberry
9	c/o Office of Regional Inspector
10	Internal Revenue Service
11	P.O. Box 6238
12	Laguna Niguel 92607
13	CALIFORNIA, USA
14	·
15	Matthew Finney
16	c/o Office of Regional Inspector
17	Internal Revenue Service
18	P.O. Box 6238
19	Laguna Niguel 92607
20	CALIFORNIA, USA
21	CALIFORNIA, ODA
22	Office of the Chief Counsel
23	Internal Revenue Service
	c/o 24000 Avila Road, #3314
24	Laguna Niguel 92607
25	
26	CALIFORNIA, USA
27	John S. Gordon
28	
29	U.S. Department of Justice
30	c/o 1200 United States Courthouse
31	312 North Spring Street
32	Los Angeles 90012-4797
33	CALIFORNIA, USA
34	
35	Alicia Villarreal
36	U.S. Department of Justice
37	c/o 1300 United States Courthouse
38	312 North Spring Street
39	Los Angeles 90012-4797
40	CALIFORNIA, USA
41	
42	Brian Hershman
43	U.S. Department of Justice
44	c/o 1300 United States Courthouse
45	312 North Spring Street
46	Los Angeles 90012-4797
47	CALIFORNIA, USA
48	
49	Ronald L. Cheng
50	U.S. Department of Justice
51	c/o 1300 United States Courthouse
52	312 North Spring Street
53	Los Angeles 90012-4797
54	CALIFORNIA, USA

1	Lawrence S. Middleton
2	U.S. Department of Justice
3	c/o 1200 United States Courthouse
4	312 North Spring Street
5	Los Angeles 90012-4797
6	CALIFORNIA, USA
7	Debout T. Loston
8	Robert I. Lester
9	U.S. Department of Justice
10	Federal Building, Room 7516 300 North Los Angeles Street
11	•
12 13	Los Angeles 90012-4797 CALIFORNIA, USA
13 14	CALIFORNIA, USA
14 15	Leon W. Weidman
15 16	U.S. Department of Justice
	-
17	Federal Building, Room 7516
18	300 North Los Angeles Street
19	Los Angeles 90012-4797
20	CALIFORNIA, USA
21 22	Door D. Brogorgon
22 23	Dean D. Pregerson United States District Court
23 24	312 North Spring St., Courtroom 3
2 4 25	Los Angeles 90012-4797
25 26	CALIFORNIA, USA
20 27	CALIFORNIA, ODA
2 <i>1</i> 28	John A. Chambers
20 29	Courtroom Clerk
30	United States District Court
31	312 North Spring St., Courtroom 3
32	Los Angeles 90012-4797
33	CALIFORNIA, USA
34	GHELL GRAFITY OFF
35	Beth Zaccaro
36	Court Reporter
37	United States District Court
38	312 North Spring St., Courtroom 3
39	Los Angeles 90012-4797
40	CALIFORNIA, USA
41	
42	Gregory Nicolaysen, Esquire $[sic]$
43	dba Federal Criminal Defense Attorney
44	16000 Ventura Boulevard, Suite 500
45	Encino 91436
46	CALIFORNIA, USA
47	•
48	Teresa Giordano
49	Quality Paralegal Services
50	c/o 40960 California Oaks Road, Box 281
51	Murrieta 92562
52	CALIFORNIA, USA

1	Courtesy Copies to:		
2	F	Article I:	
3	Danier Den Paul		Legislative Branch
4	Representative Ron Paul		negibiaeive bianen
5	U.S. House of Representatives Washington 20515		
6 7	DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA		
8		rticle II:	
9		101010 11.	
10	Office of the President		Chief Executive Officer:
11	The White House		Executive Branch
12	1600 Pennsylvania Avenue		
13	Washington 20500		
14	DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA		
15			
16	United States Marshals Service		Law Enforcement:
17	411 West Fourth Street		Executive Branch
18	Santa Ana 92701-4516		
19	CALIFORNIA, USA		
20			
21	United States Marshals Service		Law Enforcement:
22	312 North Spring Street		Executive Branch
23	Los Angeles 90012-4797		
24	CALIFORNIA, USA		
25	A	rticle III:	
26 27	Tudes Florence-Marie Cooper		District Court:
28	Judge Florence-Marie Cooper c/o Alicia Mason, Court Clerk		Judicial Branch
28 29	255 E. Temple St., 750 Roybal E	RI da	oudioidi Didnon
30	Los Angeles 90012-4797	rag.	
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33	Judge Alex Kozinski (supervisir	ng)	Circuit Court:
34	Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals		Judicial Branch
35	P.O. Box 91510		
36	Pasadena 91109-1510		
37	CALIFORNIA, USA		
38			
39	Chief Justice William H. Rehnqu		Supreme Court:
40	Supreme Court of the United Sta	ates	Judicial Branch
41	One First Street, N.E.		
42	Washington 20543-0001		
43	DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA		
44	rate Mana Dublication #221 for	addragging	instructions 1
45	[See USPS Publication #221 for	addressing	instructions.
46			
47	Dated: June 4, 2002 A.D.		
48 49	Dated: June 4, 2002 A.D.		
50			
51	Signed: /s/ Paul Andrew Mitche	ell	
52			
53	Printed: Paul Andrew Mitchell,	Private At	torney General

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11	Attachment "A":
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12	
13	"Let's Dismantle IRS:
14	This Racket is Busted"
	THIS NACKET IS BUSECU
15	
16	http://www.supremelaw.org/press/rels/dismantle.irs.htm
17	
18	by
19	
	Paul Andrew Mitchell
20	
21	Private Attorney General
22	and Qualified Federal Witness
23	
24	All Rights Reserved without Prejudice
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Let's Dismantle IRS: This Racket is Busted

by

Paul Andrew Mitchell Private Attorney General

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It's time to dismantle the Internal Revenue Service. This organization has outlived its usefulness.

The hunt was on, several years ago, when activists like this writer confirmed that IRS was never created by any Act of Congress. It cannot be found in any of the laws which created the U.S. Department of the Treasury.

The U.S. Supreme Court quietly admitted as much, at footnote 23 in <u>Chrysler Corp. v. Brown</u>. In a nation governed by the rule of law, this omission is monumental.

The search for its real origins has taken this nation down many blind alleys, so convoluted and complicated are the statutes and regulations which govern its employees rarely, if ever.

The best explanation now favors its links to Prohibition, the ill-fated experiment in outlawing alcohol.

The Women's Temperance Movement, we believe, was secretly underwritten by the petroleum cartel, to perfect a monopoly over automotive fuels. Once that monopoly was in place, Prohibition was repealed, leaving alcohol high and dry as the preferred fuel for cars and trucks, and leaving a federal police force inside the several States, to extort money from the American People.

All evidence indicates that IRS is an alias for the Federal Alcohol Administration ("FAA"), which was declared unconstitutional inside the several States by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1935. The result of the high Court's decision in <u>U.S. v. Constantine</u> confined that FAA to federal territories, like Puerto Rico, where Congress is the "state" legislature.

Further confirmation can be found in a decision by the First Circuit Court of Appeals in <u>Used Tire International</u>, <u>Inc. v. Manual Diaz-Saldana</u>, which identified the latter as the real "Secretary of the Treasury." The Code of Federal Regulations for Title 27 also identifies this other "Secretary" as an office in San Juan, Puerto Rico.

This is ominous data. It serves to suggest that IRS has no authority whatsoever to mail envelopes from the "Department of the Treasury." Such obvious deception is prohibited by federal mail fraud statutes, and defined as a predicate to racketeering.

Moreover, the vagueness now proven to frequent the Internal Revenue Code forces a legal conclusion that the entire Code is necessarily void, read "no legal effect." The high Court's test for vagueness is obviously violated when men and women of common intelligence cannot agree on its correct meaning, its proper construction, or its territorial application.

Take, for instance, a statute at IRC section 7851. Here,

Congress has said that all the enforcement provisions in subtitle F shall take effect on the day <u>after</u> the date "this title" is enacted. These provisions include, for example, filing requirements, penalties for failing to file, and tax evasion.

Guess what?

Title 26 has never been enacted into positive law, rendering every single section in subtitle F a big pile of spaghetti, with no teeth whatsoever. Throughout most federal laws, the consistent legislative practice is to use the term "this title" to refer to a Title of the United States Code.

To make matters worse, conscientious courts (an endangered species) have ruled that taxes cannot be imposed without statutes assigning a specific liability to certain parties.

There are no statutes creating a specific liability for taxes imposed by subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code. This is the set of statutes that impose the federal income tax.

Look at it this way: if Congress imposed a tax on chickens, would that necessarily mean that the chickens are liable for the tax?

Obviously not! Congress would also need to define the farmer, or the consumer, or the wholesaler, as the party liable for paying that tax. Chickens, where are your tax returns?

Without a liability statute, there can be no liability.

This now opens another, deeper layer in this can of rotting worms. If IRS is really using fear tactics to extort an unlawful debt, then it qualifies for careful scrutiny, and prosecution, under the Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act aka "RICO".

How fitting, and how ironic, that IRS is legally domiciled in Puerto RICO.

When we get down to brass tacks, we find that Congress encourages private Citizens to investigate and bust rackets, mainly because it perceived a shortage of public prosecutors talented enough to enforce RICO statutes against organized crime syndicates.

This shortage is the real reason why the RICO statute at $\underline{18}$ $\underline{\text{U.S.C. }1964}$ awards triple damages to any party who prevails, using the civil remedies it provides. And, happily, State courts like the Superior Court of California also enjoy original jurisdiction to litigate and issue these remedies.

All of this would approach comedy in the extreme, were it not also the case that IRS launders huge sums of money, every day, into foreign banks chiefly owned by the families that founded the Federal Reserve system.

Did you think the Federal Reserve was federal government? Guess again!

One of the biggest shocks of the last century was an admission by President Reagan's Grace Commission, that none of the income taxes collected by IRS goes to pay for any federal government services.

Those taxes are paying interest to these foreign banks, and benefit payments to recipients of entitlement programs, like federal pension funds.

So, the next time your neighbors accuse you of being unpatriotic for challenging the IRS, we recommend that you demand from them *proof* that IRS is really funding any federal government services, like air traffic control, the Pentagon, the Congress, the Courts, or the White House.

Don't hold your breath.

Honestly, when all the facts are put on a level table top, there is not a single reason why America should put up with this massive fiscal fraud for one more day.

It's now time to dismantle the Internal Revenue Service.

Keeping all those laundered funds inside this country will result in economic prosperity without precedent in our nation's history.

Let's bury IRS beneath the Titanic, where it can rust in peace forever along with the rest of the planet's jellyfish.

America deserves to be a living, thriving Republic, not another victim of Plank Number Two in the Communist Manifesto.

About the Author:

Paul Andrew Mitchell is a Private Attorney General and Webmaster of the Supreme Law Library on the Internet:

http://www.supremelaw.org

See also:

"U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Falls Silent in Face of SUBPOENA for Tax Liability Statutes"

"31 Questions and Answers about the IRS"

"What Is the Federal Income Tax?"

"Electronic Censors Found at U.C. Berkeley's Law School"

"Private Attorney General Backs UCB's Graduate Instructors"

"Paul Mitchell Blasts Clinton, Rubin for Racketeering"

"Paul Mitchell Applauds House Vote to Kill IRC"

"Paul Mitchell Urges Nation to Boycott IRS"

"The Kick-Back Racket: PMRS"

"Congresswoman Suspected of Income Tax Evasion"

"Our Proposal to Save Social Security"

"Charitable Contributions by the Federal Reserve"

"Legal Notice in re Withholding Exemption Certificates"

"A Cogent Summary of Federal Jurisdictions"

"BATF/IRS -- Criminal Fraud"

"Income Taxes and Government Fraud"

"A Monologue on Federal Fiscal Fraud"

"Miscellaneous Letters of Correspondence"

#

Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S. Private Attorney General c/o General Delivery Sunset Beach 90742 CALIFORNIA, USA In Propria Persona	PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY PANEL ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM 2005 MAR 30 A 8: 48 PAST DUE
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UNITED STATES	COURT OF APPEALS
NINT	H CIRCUIT
Lynne Meredith et al., Plaintiffs/Appellees, v. Andrew Erath et al., Defendants/Appellants. United States ex relatione) No. 02-55021))))))))))))))))) NOTICE OF MOTION AND) MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIO
Movant.	<pre>Article I, Section 8, Clause 1; Article I, Section 9, Clause 7; Internal Revenue Code § 7809; 31 U.S.C. 301(f)(2); and FRAP Rules 8(a)(1)(C) and 8(a)(2) in pari materia with FRCP Rules 64 and 65.</pre>
Respondent.))))
COMES NOW the United States (he:	reinafter "Movant") <i>ex relatione</i> 1
Andrew Mitchell, Citizen of ONE	OF the United States of America
Private Attorney General (her	einafter "Relator") to move

Motion for Preliminary Injunction: Page 1 of 10

honorable Court, pursuant to: Rules 8(a)(1)(C) and 8(a)(2) of Federal

Rules of Appellate Procedure ("FRAP"), section ("§") 7809 of the

48

Internal Revenue Code, and Article I, Section 8, Clause 1, and Article
1, Section 9, Clause 7, in the Constitution for the United States of
America, as lawfully amended (hereinafter "U.S. Constitution"), for a
preliminary ORDER freezing all of Respondent's assets and enjoining
Respondent from depositing any tax collections into any account(s)

other than the Treasury of the United States.

- Mounting evidence recently confirmed by Movant appears to indicate that Respondent Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") has been systematically violating section 7809 of the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC"). Said section clearly mandates that:
 - ... collections of whatever nature received or collected by authority of any internal revenue law, shall be paid daily into the Treasury of the United States under instructions of the Secretary as internal revenue collections, by the officer or employee receiving or collecting the same, without any abatement or deduction on account of salary, compensation, fees, costs, charges, expenses, or claims of any description.

[IRC § 7809(a), **bold** emphasis added]

Statements verified under 28 U.S.C. 1746(1), and filed in federal district court in San Jose, California, Clerk's Docket #CR-00-20227-JF, suggest that monies collected by IRS personnel have been deposited in a "quad zero" account and left there for at least one (1) full year, without proper accounting. See, for example, Treasury Order 91 (Rev. 1), May 12, 1986.

Monies collected by IRS have also been used in recent years to make *cash* awards, under color of the Internal Revenue Manual and of a now defunct federal program formerly called the Performance Management and Recognition System ("PMRS").

PMRS abuses reportedly became so severe, Congress repealed this incentive system in 1993, but serious abuses continued.

A FOIA request for records of <u>all</u> PMRS awards was met with a written admission -- by an IRS Tax Law Specialist -- that few records existed because the awards were paid in <u>cash</u>! See 5 U.S.C. 552; and the Anti-Kickback Act of 1986, 41 U.S.C. 51 et seq. This admission also raised the spectre of widespread federal income tax evasion (a felony) by every recipient of these cash awards, e.g. \$25,000.00 per indictment of each "TC-148" aka "illegal tax protester" [sic].

Other mounting evidence, recently confirmed in the U.S. Supreme Court case of Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979), at footnote 23, makes it clear that IRS was never created by any organic Act of Congress. See 31 U.S.C. in toto, for further confirmation. After tracing IRS genealogy all the way back to 1862 A.D., the high Court still failed to find any organic Act for the IRS. Compare the statute at 1 Stat. 65.

In 1994, the General Accounting Office ("GAO") reported it was unable to audit \$4.3 billion of the \$6.7 billion -- a staggering sixty-four percent -- of its operating funds that IRS reported spending in FY 1992, because IRS could not account for all the money. See "Financial Management: IRS Does Not Adequately Manage Its Operating Funds," Report to the Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service, February 1994 (Chapter Report, 02/09/94, Report Number GAO/AIMD-94-33).

The situation has not improved since then. In March of 1999, GAO found that pervasive weaknesses in the design and operation of Respondent's financial management systems, accounting procedures, documentation, recordkeeping, and internal controls prevented GAO from rendering an unqualified opinion on five of IRS' six principal

- financial statements. Put simply, <u>they flunked</u>. See "Internal Revenue Service: Results of Fiscal Year 1998 Financial Statement
- 3 Audit," March 1, 1999 (Report Number T-AIMD-99-103).

any government services!

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- The worst shock of the last century was a startling admission in the final report of the President's Private Sector Survey on Cost Control, commonly known as the Grace Commission (named after Chairman J. Peter Grace). The Grace Commission concluded that none of the federal income taxes collected by the IRS were being used to pay for
- Instead, those collections are, evidently, being used to service the massive federal debt owed to banks, many of which are foreign
- banks, and to make income transfer payments to beneficiaries of

entitlement programs, e.g. federal pension plans. See "War on Waste:

- 14 President's Private Sector Survey on Cost Control," New York,
- MacMillan Publishing Company, January 12, 1984 (ISBN 0-02-074660-1).
- It is extremely doubtful, if not impossible, that so much money would show up missing, if IRS were not also violating IRC § 7809, daily and as a matter of institutional policy. Can it be trillions?
 - Further proof of IRC § 7809 violations can be found on the cancelled checks which untold numbers of taxpayers have submitted to pay federal income taxes since 1913 A.D., along with their completed Form 1040's -- the **U.S. Individual** Income Tax Return (not Individual Income [sic]).
 - All too frequently in the recent past, IRS endorsed these checks payable to "Any F.R.B ... in Payment of U.S. Oblig.", and <u>not</u> to the Treasury of the United States. See 27 CFR 70.11: definitions of "Commercial bank" and "Treasury Account"; also Lewis v. United

- States, 680 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1982), holding that Federal Reserve
 Banks are privately owned entities and not federal agencies; 27 CFR
 3 250.11: "Revenue Agent", "Secretary" etc. defined; §§ 3(c), 6, 10 of
 4 the Bretton Woods Agreements Act, 59 Stat. 512, P.L. 171, July 31,
 5 1945, in "A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents,
 6 1941-49," prepared at the request of the Senate Committee on Foreign
 7 Relations by the Staff of the Committee and the Department of State,
 8 Washington, D.C., U.S. GPO (1950); 22 U.S.C. 286a; 31 U.S.C. 5341:
- Thus, Movant argues that <u>all</u> IRS collections <u>without exception</u>

 should be paid <u>daily</u> into the Treasury of the United States, **as**required by Law.

If this is not the case, no matter how large or small the sums of money may be, this Court has the power, authority, and legal obligation to issue a preliminary ORDER, with all deliberate speed, enjoining Respondent IRS from depositing collections of whatever nature into any account(s) other than the Treasury of the United States. See IRC §§ 7809(a), (b), and (d) in pari materia with FRCP Rule 65.

For the purpose of securing satisfaction of the judgment ultimately to be entered in this action, Movant hereby also seeks an immediate ORDER freezing all assets of Respondent IRS, in pari materia with FRCP Rule 64 and executed by other appropriate ORDER(s).

national strategy.

FORMAL OFFER OF PROOF

Movant hereby formally offers to prove that Respondent IRS is an alias for Trust #62, domiciled in Puerto Rico under color of the Federal Alcohol Administration. See 31 U.S.C. 1321(a)(62).

Movant also offers to prove that the links between the Internal Revenue Code, the Code of Federal Regulations ("CFR") for Title 26, and Title 27 of the United States Code ("U.S.C."), have their historical roots in Prohibition (the Volstead Act), which permitted the petroleum cartel to establish a monopoly in automotive fuels, and permitted the United States to field a federal police force inside the several States of the Union.

Once the monopoly was in place, Prohibition was lifted, leaving alcohol high and dry as the preferred fuel for automobiles, and leaving the federal police force in place — to extort money from the American People. See, e.g. Pogue Carburetor patent (an efficient fuel vaporizer utilized in Allied tanks fighting field marshal Erwin Rommel in the North Africa campaign during World War II).

STANDING OBJECTION IN RE POWERS OF ATTORNEY

Movant formally objects, in advance, to any and all attempts by duly appointed officers of the U.S. Department of Justice to appear on behalf of IRS, to answer the instant MOTION. See 5 U.S.C. 551(1)(C).

Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 301(f)(2), only the duly appointed IRS Chief Counsel has been delegated lawful power(s) of attorney to appear on behalf of Respondent IRS. Title 31, U.S.C., has been enacted into positive law; Title 26, U.S.C. has not, however.

Similarly, the Solicitor General also appears to lack any lawful power(s) of attorney to appear on behalf of Respondent IRS.

A.	ll pr	emises	s havi	.ng b	een	duly	considered,	and	in	lig	ht	of	the
demonst	rable	nati	onal	urgen	ıcy	which	evidently	exist	s f	for	the	ak	ove
stated	reaso	ns, i	Movant	res	pect	fully	petitions	this	hon	orak	ole	Uni	.ted
States	Court	of Ar	opeals	for	the	follo	wing prelim:	inarv	rel	ief:			

- (1) an ORDER freezing all assets of Respondent IRS, with all deliberate speed, for the purpose of securing satisfaction of the final judgment ultimately to be entered in this matter, pursuant to FRAP Rules 8(a)(1)(C) and 8(a)(2), and in pari materia with FRCP Rule 64;
- (2) a preliminary ORDER enjoining Respondent IRS, with all deliberate speed, from depositing monies, received or collected by authority of any internal revenue law, into any account other than the Treasury of the United States, in pari materia with FRCP Rule 65; and,

all other relief which this Court deems just and proper, under the apparently urgent circumstances which have occasioned this MOTION.

1	VERIFICATION
2	I, Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris, hereby verify, under penalty of
3	perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without the
4	"United States" (federal government), that the above statement of
5	facts and laws is true and correct, according to the best of My
6	current information, knowledge, and belief, so help me God, pursuant
7	to 28 U.S.C. 1746(1). See Supremacy Clause (Constitution, Laws and
8	Treaties are all the supreme Law of the Land).
9 10 11 12 13	Dated: April 25, 2002 A.D.
14 15	Signed: /s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell
16	Printed: Paul Andrew Mitchell, Private Attorney General

1	PROOF OF SERVICE
2	I, Paul Andrew Mitchell, Sui Juris, hereby certify, under penalty of
3	perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without the
4	"United States" (federal government), that I am at least 18 years of
5	age, a Citizen of ONE OF the United States of America , and that I
6	personally served the following document(s):
7 8 9 10 11	NOTICE OF MOTION AND MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION: Article I, Section 8, Clause 1; Article I, Section 9, Clause 7;
12	Internal Revenue Code § 7809;
13	31 U.S.C. $301(f)(2)$; and
14 15	FRAP Rules 8(a)(1)(C) and 8(a)(2) in pari materia with
16	FRCP Rules 64 and 65.
17	
18	by placing one true and correct copy of said document(s) in first
19	class United States Mail, with postage prepaid and properly addressed
20	to the following:
21	Clerk of Court (5x)
22 23	Attention: Cathy Catterson Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
24	P.O. Box 193939
25	San Francisco 94119-3939
26	CALIFORNIA, USA
27	
28	Lynne Meredith
29	Booking #24001112
30	Federal Detention Center
31 32	17645 Industrial Farm Road Bakersfield 93308
33	CALIFORNIA, USA
34	
35	Gayle Bybee
36	c/o Marcia J. Brewer
37	300 Corporate Pointe, Suite 330
38	Culver City 90230
39 40	CALIFORNIA, USA
41	Jenifer Meredith
42	c/o P.O. Box 370
43	Sunset Beach 90742
44	CALIFORNIA, USA
45	

1	Carla Figaro			
2	21213-B Hawthorne Blvd., #5361			
3	Torrance	Torrance 90503		
4	CALIFORN	CALIFORNIA, USA		
5				
6	Andrew Erath			
7	c/o Office of Regional Inspector			
8	Internal Revenue Service			
9	P.O. Box 6238			
10		Laguna Niguel 92607		
11	CALIFORN	_		
12	CABII OM.	IA, ODA		
13	Dichard (Stack and Darwin Thomas	Pohogas Charkman	
			Rebecca Sparkman	
14		n Los Angeles Street	Internal Revenue Service	
15	·		24000 Avila Road, #3314	
16	_		Laguna Niguel 92607	
17	CALIFORN	IA, USA	CALIFORNIA, USA	
18				
19		W. Wolfinger	Victor Song	
20	U.S. Depa	artment of Justice	Internal Revenue Service	
21	Appellate	e Section	24000 Avila Road, #3314	
22	P.O. Box 502 Laguna Niguel 92607			
23	Washingto	on 20044	CALIFORNIA, USA	
24	DISTRICT	OF COLUMBIA, USA		
25 [•]				
26	Patricia	Mazon	Office of the Chief Counsel	
27	Internal	Revenue Service	Internal Revenue Service	
28	501 West	Ocean Boulevard	c/o 24000 Avila Road	
29	Long Beach Laguna Niguel 92607			
30	CALIFORN		CALIFORNIA, USA	
31	OHELL OTHER	,		
32				
33	Courtesy	Copies to:		
34	Courcesy	copies to:		
35	Office of the Solicitor General			
36	950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Room 5614			
	Washington 20530-0001			
37				
38	DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA			
39				
40	Judge Alex Kozinski (supervising)			
41	Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals			
42	P.O. Box 91510			
43	Pasadena 91109-1510			
44	CALIFORNIA, USA			
45				
46	[See USPS Publication #221 for addressing instructions.]			
47				
48				
49	Dated:	April 25, 2002 A.D.		
50				
51				
52	Signed:	/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell		
53	-			
54	Printed:	Paul Andrew Mitchell, Pri	vate Attorney General	
			_	

31 Questions and Answer RESIDENT'S ADVISORY 1 the Internal Revenue Service TAX REFORM 2 3 Revision 3.2 2005 MAR 30 A 8 48 4 5 6 certified by 7 8 Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S. Citizen of California, Federal Witness, 9 Private Attorney General, Author and 10 Webmaster of the Supreme Law Library 11 12 13 Internet URL of home page: http://www.supremelaw.org 14 15 Internet URL of this file: 16 http://www.supremelaw.org/sls/31answers.htm 17 18 19 Common Law Copyright All Rights Reserved without Prejudice 20 21 22 Is the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") an organization within 23 1. the U.S. Department of the Treasury? 24 25 The IRS is not an organization within the United 26 Answer: No. States Department of the Treasury. The U.S. Department of the 27 Treasury was organized by statutes now codified in Title 31 of 28 the United States Code, abbreviated "31 U.S.C." The only mention 29 30 of the IRS anywhere in 31 U.S.C. §§ 301-310 is an authorization for the President to appoint an Assistant General Counsel in the 31 32 U.S. Department of the Treasury to be the Chief Counsel for the See 31 U.S.C. 301(f)(2). 33 IRS. 34 At footnote 23 in the case of Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 35 36 281 (1979), the U.S. Supreme Court admitted that no organic Act 37 for the IRS could be found, after they searched for such an Act all the way back to the Civil War, which ended in the year 1865 38 The Guarantee Clause in the U.S. Constitution guarantees 39 40 the Rule of Law to all Americans (we are to be governed by Law and not by arbitrary bureaucrats). See Article IV, Section 4. 41 Since there was no organic Act creating it, IRS is not a lawful 42 43 organization. 44 45 46 2. If not an organization within the U.S. Department of the Treasury, then what exactly is the IRS? 47 48 The IRS appears to be a collection agency working for 49 Answer: foreign banks and operating out of Puerto Rico under color of the 50 Federal Alcohol Administration ("FAA"). But the FAA was promptly 51 declared unconstitutional inside the 50 States by the U.S. 52 Supreme Court in the case of U.S. v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 53 (1935), because Prohibition had already been repealed. 54

In 1998, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit identified a second "Secretary of the Treasury" as a man by the name of Manual Díaz-Saldaña. See the definitions of "Secretary" and "Secretary or his delegate" at 27 CFR 26.11 (formerly 27 CFR 250.11), and the published decision in <u>Used Tire International</u>, Inc. v. Manual Díaz-Saldaña, court docket number <u>97-2348</u>, September 11, 1998. Both definitions mention Puerto Rico.

When all the evidence is examined objectively, IRS appears to be a money laundry, extortion racket, and conspiracy to engage in a pattern of racketeering activity, in violation of 18~U.S.C.~1951 and 1961~et~seq. ("RICO"). Think of Puerto RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act); in other words, it is an organized crime syndicate operating under false and fraudulent pretenses.

3. By what legal authority, if any, has the IRS established offices inside the 50 States of the Union?

Answer: After much diligent research, several investigators have concluded that there is no known Act of Congress, nor any Executive Order, giving IRS lawful jurisdiction to operate within any of the 50 States of the Union.

Their presence within the 50 States appears to stem from certain Agreements on Coordination of Tax Administration (" \underline{ACTA} "), which officials in those States have consummated with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. A $\underline{template}$ for ACTA agreements can be found at the IRS Internet website and in the $\underline{Supreme\ Law\ Library}$ on the Internet.

However, those ACTA agreements are demonstrably fraudulent, for example, by expressly defining "IRS" as a lawful bureau within the U.S. Department of the Treasury. (See Answer to Question 1 above.) Moreover, those ACTA agreements also appear to violate State laws requiring competitive bidding before such a service government awarded by State a be contract can There is no evidence to indicate that ACTA subcontractor. agreements were reached after competitive bidding processes; the contrary, the IRS is adamant about maintaining a monopoly syndicate.

4. Can IRS legally show "Department of the Treasury" on their outgoing mail?

Answer: No. It is obvious that such deceptive nomenclature is intended to convey the false impression that IRS is a lawful bureau or department within the <u>U.S. Department of the Treasury</u>. Federal laws prohibit the use of United States Mail for fraudulent purposes. Every piece of U.S. Mail sent from IRS with "Department of the Treasury" in the return address, is one count of mail fraud.

5. Does the U.S. Department of Justice have power of attorney to represent the IRS in federal court?

2 3 4

Answer: No. Although the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") does have power of attorney to represent federal agencies before federal courts, the IRS is not an "agency" as that term is legally defined in the Freedom of Information Act or in the Administrative Procedures Act. The governments of all federal Territories are expressly excluded from the definition of federal "agency" by Act of Congress. See 5 U.S.C. 551(1)(C).

Since IRS is domiciled in <u>Puerto Rico</u> (RICO?), it is thereby <u>ex</u>cluded from the definition of federal agencies which can be represented by the DOJ. The IRS Chief Counsel, appointed by the President under authority of <u>31 U.S.C. 301(f)(2)</u>, can appear, or appoint a delegate to appear in federal court on behalf of IRS and IRS employees. Again, see the Answer to <u>Question 1</u> above. As far as powers of attorney are concerned, the chain of command begins with Congress, flows to the President, and then to the IRS Chief Counsel, and NOT to the U.S. Department of Justice.

6. Were the so-called 14th and 16th amendments properly ratified?

Answer: No. Neither was properly ratified. In the case of People v. Boxer (December 1992), docket number #S-030016, U.S. Senator Barbara Boxer fell totally silent in the face of an Application to the California Supreme Court by the People of California, for an ORDER compelling Senator Boxer to witness the material evidence against the so-called 16^{th} amendment.

That so-called "amendment" allegedly authorized federal income taxation, even though it contains no provision expressly repealing two Constitutional Clauses mandating that direct taxes <u>must</u> be apportioned. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court have both <u>ruled</u> that repeals by implication are not favored. See <u>Crawford Fitting Co. et al. v. J.T.</u> Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 442 (1987).

The material evidence in question was summarized in AFFIDAVIT's that were properly executed and filed in that case. Boxer fell totally silent, thus rendering those affidavits the "truth of the case." The so-called $16^{\rm th}$ amendment has now been correctly identified as a major fraud upon the American People and the United States. Major fraud against the United States is a serious federal offense. See 18 U.S.C. 1031.

 Similarly, the so-called $14^{\rm th}$ amendment was never properly ratified either. In the case of <u>Dyett v. Turner</u>, 439 P.2d 266, 270 (1968), the Utah Supreme Court recited numerous historical facts proving, beyond *any* shadow of a doubt, that the so-called $14^{\rm th}$ amendment was likewise a major fraud upon the American People.

Those facts, in many cases, were Acts of the several State Legislatures voting for or against that proposal to amend the $\underline{\text{U.S. Constitution}}$. The Supreme Law Library has a $\underline{\text{collection}}$ of references detailing this major fraud.

The U.S. Constitution requires that constitutional amendments be ratified by $\underline{\text{three-fourths}}$ of the several States. As such, their Acts are governed by the $\underline{\text{Full Faith and Credit Clause}}$ in the U.S. Constitution. See Article IV, Section 1.

Judging by the sheer amount of litigation its various sections have generated, particularly Section 1, the so-called $14^{\rm th}$ amendment is one of the worst pieces of legislation ever written in American history. The phrase "subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" is properly understood to mean "subject to the municipal jurisdiction of Congress." (See Answer to Question 19 below.)

For this one reason alone, the Congressional Resolution proposing the so-called $14^{\rm th}$ amendment is provably vague and therefore unconstitutional. See 14 Stat. 358-359, Joint Resolution No. 48, June 16, 1866.

7. Where are the statutes that create a *specific* liability for federal income taxes?

Answer: Section 1 of the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC") contains no provisions creating a specific liability for taxes imposed by subtitle A. Aside from the statutes which apply only to federal government employees, pursuant to the Public Salary Tax Act, the only other statutes that create a specific liability for federal income taxes are those itemized in the definition of "Withholding agent" at IRC section 7701(a)(16). For example, see IRC section 1461. A separate liability statute for "employment" taxes imposed by subtitle C is found at IRC section 3403.

After a worker authorizes a payroll officer to withhold taxes, typically by completing Form W-4, the payroll officer then becomes a withholding agent who is legally and specifically liable for payment of all taxes withheld from that worker's paycheck. Until such time as those taxes are paid in full into the Treasury of the United States, the withholding agent is the only party who is legally liable for those taxes, not the worker. See IRC section 7809 ("Treasury of the United States").

If the worker opts instead to complete a Withholding Exemption Certificate, consistent with IRC section $3402\,(n)$, the payroll officer is not thereby authorized to withhold any federal income taxes. In this latter situation, there is absolutely no liability for the worker or for the payroll officer; in other words, there is no liability PERIOD, specifically because there is no withholding agent.

8. Can a federal regulation create a specific liability, when no specific liability is created by the corresponding statute?

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Answer: No. The U.S. Constitution vests $\underline{\text{all}}$ legislative power in the Congress of the United States. See $\underline{\text{Article I, Section 1}}$. The Executive Branch of the federal government has no legislative power whatsoever. This means that agencies of the Executive Branch, and also the federal Courts in the Judicial Branch, are prohibited from making law.

 If an Act of Congress fails to create a specific liability for any tax imposed by that Act, then there is no liability for that tax. Executive agencies have no authority to cure any such omission by using regulations to create a liability.

"[A]n administrative agency may not create a criminal offense or any liability not sanctioned by the lawmaking authority, especially a liability for a tax or inspection fee." See Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Acker, 361 U.S. 87, 4 L.Ed.2d 127, 80 S.Ct. 144 (1959), and Independent Petroleum Corp. v. Fly, 141 F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1944) as cited at 2 Am Jur 2d, p. 129, footnote 2 (1962 edition) [bold emphasis added]. However, this cite from American Jurisprudence has been removed from the 1994 edition of that legal encyclopedia.

9. The federal regulations create an income tax liability for what specific *classes* of people?

Answer: The regulations at 26 CFR 1.1-1 attempted to create a specific liability for all "citizens of the United States" and all "residents of the United States". However, those regulations correspond to IRC $\underline{\text{section 1}}$, which does $\underline{\text{not}}$ create a specific liability for taxes $\underline{\text{imposed}}$ by subtitle A.

Therefore, these regulations are an overly broad extension of the underlying statutory authority; as such, they are unconstitutional, null and void *ab initio* (from the beginning, in Latin). The <u>Acker</u> case cited above held that federal regulations can <u>not</u> exceed the underlying statutory authority. (See Answer to Question 8 above.)

10. How many *classes* of citizens are there, and how did this number come to be?

Answer: There are two (2) classes of citizens: State Citizens and federal citizens. The first class originates in the Qualifications Clauses in the U.S. Constitution, where the term "Citizen of the United States" is used. (See $\underline{1:2:2}$, $\underline{1:3:3}$ and 2:1:5.) Notice the UPPER-CASE "C" in "Citizen".

The pertinent court cases have defined the term "United States" in these Clauses to mean "States United", and the full term means

"Citizen of ONE OF the States United". See People v. De La Guerra, 40 Cal. 311, 337 (1870); Judge Pablo De La Guerra signed the California Constitution of 1849, when California first joined the Union. Similar terms are found in the Diversity Clause at Article III, Section 2, Clause 1, and in the Privileges and Immunities Clause at Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1. Prior to the Civil War, there was only one (1) class of Citizens under American Law. See the holding in Pannill v. Roanoke, 252 F. 910, 914-915 (1918), for definitive authority on this key point.

The second class originates in the 1866 Civil Rights Act, where the term "citizen of the United States" is used. This Act was later codified at 42 U.S.C. 1983. Notice the lower-case "c" in The pertinent court cases have held that Congress "citizen". thereby created a <u>municipal franchise</u> primarily for members of the Negro race, who were freed by President Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation (a war measure), and later by the Thirteenth Amendment banning slavery and involuntary servitude. Compelling payment of a "tax" for which there is no liability statute is tantamount to involuntary servitude, and extortion.

 Instead of using the unique term "federal citizen", as found in Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, it is now clear that the Radical Republicans who sponsored the 1866 Civil Rights Act were attempting to confuse these two classes of citizens. Then, they attempted to elevate this second class to constitutional status, by proposing a $14^{\rm th}$ amendment to the U.S. Constitution. As we now know, that proposal was never ratified. (See Answer to Question 6 above.)

Numerous court cases have struggled to clarify the important differences between the $\underline{\text{two classes}}$. One of the most definitive, and dispositive cases, is $\underline{\text{Pannill v. Roanoke}}$, 252 F. 910, 914-915 (1918), which clearly held that federal citizens had no standing to sue under the $\underline{\text{Diversity Clause}}$, because they were not even contemplated when Article III in the U.S. Constitution was first being drafted, circa 1787 A.D.

Another is Ex parte Knowles, 5 Cal. 300 (1855) in which the California Supreme Court ruled that there was no such thing as a "citizen of the United States" (as of the year 1855 A.D.). Only federal citizens have standing to invoke 42 U.S.C. 1983; whereas State Citizens do not. See <u>Wadleigh v. Newhall</u>, 136 F. 941 (C.C. Cal. 1905).

 Many more cases can be cited to confirm the existence of two classes of citizens under American Law. These cases are thoroughly documented in the book entitled "The Federal Zone: Cracking the Code of Internal Revenue" by Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S., now in its eleventh edition. See also the pleadings in the case of USA v. Gilbertson, also in the Supreme Law Library.

11. Can one be a State Citizen, without also being a federal citizen?

Answer: Yes. The 1866 Civil Rights Act was municipal law, confined to the District of Columbia and other limited areas where Congress is the "state" government with exclusive legislative jurisdiction there. These areas are now identified as "the federal zone." (Think of it as the blue field on the American flag; the stars on the flag are the 50 States.) As such, the 1866 Civil Rights Act had no effect whatsoever upon the lawful status of State Citizens, then or now.

Several courts have already recognized our Right to be State Citizens without also becoming federal citizens. For excellent examples, see State v. Fowler, 41 La. Ann. 380, 6 S. 602 (1889) and Gardina v. Board of Registrars, 160 Ala. 155, 48 S. 788, 791 (1909). The Maine Supreme Court also clarified the issue by explaining our "Right of Election" or "freedom of choice," namely, our freedom to choose between two different forms of government. See 44 Maine 518 (1859), Hathaway, J. dissenting.

Since the <u>Guarantee Clause</u> does not require the federal government to guarantee a Republican Form of Government to the federal zone, Congress is free to create a <u>different</u> form of government there, and so it has. In his dissenting opinion in <u>Downes v. Bidwell</u>, 182 U.S. 244 at 380 (1901), Supreme Court <u>Justice Harlan called</u> it an absolute legislative democracy.

But, State Citizens are under no legal obligation to join or pledge any allegiance to that legislative democracy; their allegiance is to one or more of the several States of the Union (i.e. the white stars on the American flag, not the blue field).

12. Who was Frank Brushaber, and why was his U.S. Supreme Court case so important?

Answer: Frank Brushaber was the Plaintiff in the case of Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 240 U.S. 1 (1916), the first U.S. Supreme Court case to consider the so-called $16^{\rm th}$ amendment. Brushaber identified himself as a Citizen of New York State and a resident of the Borough of Brooklyn, in the city of New York, and nobody challenged that claim.

The Union Pacific Railroad Company was a federal corporation created by Act of Congress to build a railroad through Utah (from the Union to the Pacific), at a time when Utah was a federal Territory, i.e. inside the federal zone.

Brushaber's attorney committed an error by arguing that the company had been chartered by the State of Utah, but Utah was not a State of the Union when Congress first created that corporation.

1 2

Brushaber had purchased stock issued by the company. He then sued the company to recover taxes that Congress had imposed upon the dividends paid to its stockholders. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled against Frank Brushaber, and upheld the tax as a lawful excise, or *indirect* tax.

The most interesting result of the Court's ruling was a Treasury Decision ("T.D.") that the U.S. Department of the Treasury later issued as a direct consequence of the high Court's opinion. In T.D. 2313, the U.S. Treasury Department expressly cited the Brushaber decision, and it identified Frank Brushaber as a "nonresident alien" and the Union Pacific Railroad Company as a "domestic corporation". This Treasury Decision has never been modified or repealed.

 $\frac{\text{T.D.}}{\text{provisions}}$ is crucial evidence proving that the income tax provisions of the IRC are municipal law, with no territorial jurisdiction inside the 50 States of the Union. The U.S. Secretary of the Treasury who approved $\frac{\text{T.D.}}{\text{2313}}$ had no authority to extend the holding in the $\frac{\text{Brushaber}}{\text{case}}$ case to anyone or anything not a proper Party to that court action.

Thus, there is no escaping the conclusion that Frank Brushaber was the nonresident alien to which that Treasury Decision refers. Accordingly, all State Citizens are nonresident aliens with respect to the municipal jurisdiction of Congress, *i.e.* the federal zone.

13. What is a "Withholding agent"?

Answer: (See Answer to Question 7 first.) The term "Withholding agent" is legally defined at IRC section 7701(a)(16). It is further defined by the statutes itemized in that section, e.g. IRC 1461 where liability for funds withheld is clearly assigned. In plain English, a "withholding agent" is a person who is responsible for withholding taxes from a worker's paycheck, and then paying those taxes into the Treasury of the United States, typically on a quarterly basis. See IRC section 7809.

One cannot become a withholding agent unless workers first authorize taxes to be withheld from their paychecks. This authorization is typically done when workers opt to execute a valid W-4 "Employee's Withholding Allowance Certificate." In plain English, by signing a W-4 workers designate themselves as "employees" and certify they are allowing withholding to occur.

If workers do <u>not</u> execute a valid W-4 form, a company's payroll officer is not authorized to withhold any federal income taxes from their paychecks. In other words, the payroll officer does not have "permission" or "power of attorney" to withhold taxes, until and unless workers authorize or "allow" that withholding -- by signing Form W-4 knowingly, intentionally and voluntarily.

Pay particular attention to the term "Employee" in the title of this form. A properly executed Form W-4 creates the presumption that the workers wish to be treated as if they were "employees" of the federal government. Obviously, for people who do not work for the federal government, such a presumption is a legal fiction, at best.

14. What is a "Withholding Exemption Certificate"?

Answer: A "Withholding Exemption Certificate" is an alternative to Form W-4, authorized by IRC section $3402\,(n)$ and executed in lieu of Form W-4. Although section $3402\,(n)$ does authorize this Certificate, the IRS has never added a corresponding form to its forms catalog (see the IRS "Printed Products Catalog").

In the absence of an official IRS form, workers can use the language of section $3402\,(\mathrm{n})$ to create their own Certificates. In simple language, the worker certifies that s/he had no federal income tax liability last year, and anticipates no federal income tax liability during the current calendar year. Because there are no liability statutes for workers in the private sector, this certification is easy to justify.

Many public and private institutions have created their own form for the Withholding Exemption Certificate, e.g. California Franchise Tax Board, and Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland. This fact can be confirmed by using any search engine, e.g. google.com, to locate occurrences of the term "withholding exemption certificate" on the Internet. This term occurs several times in IRC section 3402.

15. What is "tax evasion" and who might be guilty of this crime?

Answer: "Tax evasion" is the crime of evading a lawful tax. In the context of federal income taxes, this crime can only be committed by persons who have a legal <u>liability</u> to pay, *i.e.* the withholding agent. If one is not employed by the federal government, one is not subject to the Public Salary Tax Act unless one chooses to be treated "as if" one is a federal government "employee." This is typically done by executing a valid Form W-4.

However, as discussed above, Form W-4 is not mandatory for workers who are not "employed" by the federal government. Corporations chartered by the 50 States of the Union are technically "foreign" corporations with respect to the IRC; they are decidedly not the federal government, and should not be regarded "as if" they are the federal government, particularly when they were never created by any Act of Congress.

Moreover, the Indiana Supreme Court has ruled that Congress can only create a corporation in its capacity as the Legislature for the federal zone. Such corporations are the only "domestic" corporations under the pertinent federal laws. This writer's essay entitled "A Cogent Summary of Federal Jurisdictions" clarifies this important distinction between "foreign" and "domestic" corporations in simple, straightforward language.

If Congress were authorized to create *national* corporations, such a questionable authority would invade States' rights reserved to them by the Tenth Amendment, namely, the right to charter their own domestic corporations. The repeal of Prohibition left the Tenth Amendment unqualified. See the <u>Constantine</u> case *supra*.

For purposes of the IRC, the term "employer" refers only to federal government agencies, and an "employee" is a person who works for such an "employer".

16. Why does IRS Form 1040 <u>not</u> require a Notary Public to notarize a taxpayer's signature?

Answer: This question is one of the fastest ways to unravel the fraudulent nature of federal income taxes. At 28 U.S.C. section 1746, Congress authorized written verifications to be executed under penalty of perjury without the need for a Notary Public, i.e. to witness one's signature.

This statute identifies two different formats for such written verifications: (1) those executed <u>outside</u> the "United States" and (2) those executed <u>inside</u> the "United States". These two formats correspond to sections 1746(1) and 1746(2), respectively.

What is extremely revealing in this statute is the format for verifications executed "outside the United States". In this latter format, the statute adds the qualifying phrase "under the laws of the United States of America".

Clearly, the terms "United States" and "United States of America" are both used in this same statute. They are not one and the same. The former refers to the federal government — in the U.S. Constitution and throughout most federal statutes. The latter refers to the 50 States that are united by, and under, the U.S. Constitution. 28 U.S.C. 1746 is the only federal statute in all of Title 28 of the United States Code that utilizes the term "United States of America", as such.

It is painfully if not immediately obvious, then, that verifications made under penalty of perjury are *outside* the 50 States of the Union (read "the State zone") if and when they are executed *inside* the "United States" (read "the federal zone").

Likewise, verifications made under penalty of perjury are *inside* the 50 States of the Union, if and when they are executed *outside* the "United States".

The format for signatures on Form 1040 is the one for verifications made *inside* the **United States** (federal zone) and *outside* the **United States of America** (State zone).

17. Does the term "United States" have multiple legal meanings and, if so, what are they?

Answer: Yes. The term has several meanings. The term "United States" may be used in any one of several senses. [1] It may be merely the name of a sovereign occupying the position analogous to that of other sovereigns in the family of nations. [2] It may designate the territory over which the sovereignty of the United States extends, or [3] it may be the collective name of the States which are united by and under the Constitution. See Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945) [bold emphasis, brackets and numbers added for clarity].

This is the very same definition that is found in <u>Black's Law Dictionary</u>, Sixth Edition. The second of these three meanings refers to the federal zone and to Congress *only* when it is legislating in its *municipal* capacity. For example, Congress is legislating in its municipal capacity whenever it creates a federal corporation, like the <u>United States Postal Service</u>.

It is terribly revealing of the manifold frauds discussed in these Answers, that the definition of "United States" has now been removed from the Seventh Edition of Black's Law Dictionary.

18. Is the term "income" defined in the IRC and, if not, where is it defined?

Answer: The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has already ruled that the term "income" is not defined anywhere in the IRC: "The general term 'income' is not defined in the Internal Revenue Code." U.S. v. Ballard, 535 F.2d 400, 404 (8th Circuit, 1976).

Moreover, in Mark Eisner v. Myrtle H. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 $(\underline{1920})$, the high Court told Congress it could not legislate any definition of "income" because that term was believed to be in the U.S. Constitution. The <u>Eisner</u> case was predicated on the ratification of the $\underline{16^{th}}$ amendment, which would have introduced the term "income" into the <u>U.S. Constitution</u> for the very first time (but <u>only</u> if that amendment had been properly ratified).

In Merchant's Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509 $(\underline{1921})$, the high Court defined "income" to mean the profit or gain derived from corporate activities. In that instance, the tax is a lawful excise tax imposed upon the corporate privilege of

limited liability, *i.e.* the liabilities of a corporation do not reach its officers, employees, directors or stockholders.

19. What is municipal law, and are the IRC's income tax provisions municipal law, or not?

7 8

Answer: Yes. The IRC's income tax provisions are municipal law. Municipal law is law that is enacted to govern the internal affairs of a sovereign State; in legal circles, it is also known as Private International Law. Under American Law, it has a much wider meaning than the ordinances enacted by the governing body of a municipality, i.e. city council or county board of supervisors. In fact, American legal encyclopedias define "municipal" to mean "internal", and for this reason alone, the Internal Revenue Code is really a Municipal Revenue Code.

A mountain of additional evidence has now been assembled and published in the book "The Federal Zone" to prove that the IRC's income tax provisions are municipal law.

One of the most famous pieces of evidence is a <u>letter</u> from a Connecticut Congresswoman, summarizing the advice of legal experts employed by the Congressional Research Service and the Legislative Counsel. Their advice confirmed that the meaning of "State" at IRC section 3121(e) is restricted to the named territories and possessions of D.C., Guam, Virgin Islands, American Samoa, and Puerto Rico.

In other words, the term "State" in that statute, and in all similar federal statutes, includes ONLY the places expressly named, $\underline{\text{and no more}}$.

20. What does it mean if my State is not mentioned in *any* of the federal income tax statutes?

The general rule is that federal government powers must be expressed <u>and</u> enumerated. For example, the <u>U.S. Constitution</u> is a grant of <u>enumerated</u> powers. If a power is not enumerated in the U.S. Constitution, then Congress does not have <u>any</u> authority to exercise that power. This rule is tersely expressed in the <u>Ninth Amendment</u>, in the <u>Bill of Rights</u>.

If California is not mentioned in *any* of the federal income tax statutes, then those statutes have no force or effect within that State. This is also true of all 50 States.

Strictly speaking, the omission or exclusion of anyone or any thing from a federal statute can be used to infer that the omission or exclusion was intentional by Congress. In Latin, this is tersely stated as follows: Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius. In English, this phrase is literally translated: Inclusion of one thing is the exclusion of all other things [that

are not mentioned]. This phrase can be found in any edition of Black's Law Dictionary; it is a maxim of statutory construction.

The many different definitions of the term "State" that are found in federal laws are intentionally written to appear as if they include the 50 States PLUS the other places mentioned. As the Legal experts in Congress have now confirmed, this is NOT the correct way to interpret, or to construct, these statutes.

If a place is not mentioned, every American may correctly infer that the omission of that place from a federal statute was an intentional act of Congress. Whenever it wants to do so, Congress knows how to define the term "United States" to mean the 50 States of the Union. See IRC section 4612(a)(4)(A).

21. In what other ways is the IRC deliberately vague, and what are the *real* implications for the average American?

There are numerous other ways in which the $\overline{\tt IRC}$ is deliberately vague. The absence of any legal definition for the term "income" is a classic deception. The IRS enforces the Code as a tax on everything that "comes in," but nothing could be further from the truth. "Income" is decidedly NOT everything that "comes in."

 More importantly, the fact that this vagueness is *deliberate* is sufficient grounds for concluding that the entire Code is null, void and unconstitutional, for violating our fundamental Right to know the nature and cause of any accusation, as guaranteed by the <u>Sixth Amendment</u> in the <u>Bill of Rights</u>.

Whether the vagueness is deliberate or not, any statute is unconstitutionally void if it is vague. If a statute is void for vagueness, the situation is the same as if it had never been enacted at all, and for this reason it can be ignored entirely.

22. Has <u>Title 26</u> of the United States Code ("U.S.C.") ever been enacted into positive law, and what are the legal implications if Title 26 has not been enacted into positive law?

Answer: No. Another, less obvious case of deliberate deception is the statute at IRC section 7851(a)(6)(A), where it states that the provisions of subtitle F shall take effect on the day after the date of enactment of "this title". Because the term "this title" is not defined anywhere in the IRC, least of all in the section dedicated to definitions, one is forced to look elsewhere for its meaning, or to derive its meaning from context.

Throughout $\frac{\text{Title 28}}{\text{the federal courts --}}$ of the United States Code -- the laws which govern all the federal courts -- the term "this title" clearly refers to Title 28. This fact would tend to support a conclusion that "this title", as that term is used in the IRC, refers to

Title 26 of the United States Code. However, $\underline{\text{Title 26}}$ has never been enacted into positive law, as such.

Even though all federal judges may know the secret meaning of "this title", they are men and women of $\underline{\text{UN}}$ common intelligence. The U.S. Supreme Court's test for vagueness is violated whenever men and women of $\underline{\text{common}}$ intelligence must necessarily guess at the meaning and differ as to the application of a vague statute. See $\underline{\text{Connally et al. v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)}$. Thus, federal judges are applying the wrong test for vagueness.

Accordingly, the provisions of subtitle F have never taken effect. ("F" is for enForcement!) This subtitle contains all of the enforcement statutes of the \underline{IRC} , e.g. filing requirements, penalties for failure to file and tax evasion, grants of court jurisdiction over liens, levies and seizures, summons enforcement and so on.

In other words, the \underline{IRC} is a big pile of Code without any teeth; as such, it can impose no legal obligations upon anyone, not even people with dentures!

23. What federal courts are authorized to prosecute income tax crimes?

 This question must be addressed in view of the Answer to Question $\underline{22}$ above. Although it may appear that certain statutes in the \underline{IRC} grant original jurisdiction to federal district courts, to institute prosecutions of income tax crimes, none of the statutes found in $\underline{\text{subtitle }F}$ has ever taken effect. For this reason, those statutes do not authorize the federal courts to do anything at all. As always, appearances can be very deceiving. Remember the Wizard of Oz or the mad tea party of Alice in Wonderland?

On the other hand, the federal criminal Code at <u>Title 18</u>, U.S.C., does grant general authority to the District Courts of the United States ("<u>DCUS</u>") to prosecute violations of the statutes found in that Code. See 18 U.S.C. 3231.

It is very important to appreciate the fact that these courts are not the same as the United States District Courts ("USDC"). The DCUS are constitutional courts that originate in Article III of the U.S. Constitution. The USDC are territorial tribunals, or legislative courts, that originate in Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution, also known as the Territory Clause.

This author's OPENING BRIEF to the Eighth Circuit on behalf of the Defendant in $\overline{\text{USA}}$ v. $\overline{\text{Gilbertson}}$ cites numerous court cases that have already clarified the all important distinction between these two classes of federal district courts. For example, in Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 at 312 (1922), the high Court

held that the USDC belongs in the federal Territories. This author's OPENING BRIEF to the Ninth Circuit in Mitchell v. AOL Time Warner, Inc. et al. develops this theme in even greater detail; begin reading at section "7(e)".

The <u>USDC</u>, as such, appear to lack *any* lawful authorities to prosecute income tax crimes. The USDC are *legislative* tribunals where *summary* proceedings dominate.

 For example, under the federal statute at <u>28 U.S.C. 1292</u>, the U.S. Courts of Appeal have no appellate jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders issued by the USDC. Further details on this point are available in the <u>Press Release</u> entitled <u>"Private Attorney General Cracks Title 28 of the United States Code"</u> and dated November 26, 2001 A.D.

24. Are federal judges required to pay income taxes on their pay, and what are the *real* implications if they *do* pay taxes on their pay?

Answer: No. Federal judges who are appointed to preside on the District Courts of the United States -- the <u>Article III</u> constitutional courts -- are immune from any taxation of their pay, by constitutional mandate.

The fact that all federal judges are currently paying taxes on their pay is proof of undue influence by the IRS, posing as a duly authorized agency of the Executive Branch. See Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245 ($\underline{1920}$).

 Even if the IRS were a lawful bureau or department within the U.S. Department of the Treasury (which they are NOT), the existence of undue influence by the Executive Branch would violate the fundamental principle of Separation of Powers. This principle, in theory, keeps the 3 branches of the federal government confined to their respective areas, and prevents any one branch from usurping the lawful powers that rightly belong to the other two branches.

The Separation of Powers principle is succinctly defined in Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933); however, in that decision the Supreme Court erred by defining "Party" to mean only Plaintiffs in Article III, contrary to the definition of "Party" that is found in Bouvier's Law Dictionary (1856).

 The federal judiciary, contemplated by the organic <u>U.S.</u> <u>Constitution</u>, was intended to be independent and unbiased. These two qualities are the essence, or *sine qua non* of judicial power, *i.e.* without which there is nothing. Undue influence obviously violates these two qualities. See Evans v. Gore *supra*.

In Lord v. Kelley, 240 F.Supp. 167, 169 (1965), the federal judge in that case was honest enough to admit, in his published opinion, that federal judges routinely rule in favor of the IRS,

because they fear the retaliation that might result from ruling against the IRS. There you have it, from the horse's mouth!

2 3 4

In front of a class of law students at the University of Arizona in January of 1997, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist openly admitted that <u>all</u> federal judges are currently paying taxes on their judicial pay. This writer was an eyewitness to that <u>statement</u> by the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court -- the highest Court in the land.

Thus, all federal judges are now material witnesses to the practice of concealing the Withholding Exemption Certificate from them, when they were first hired as "employees" of the federal judiciary. As material witnesses, they are thereby disqualified from presiding on all federal income tax cases.

25. Can federal grand juries issue valid indictments against illegal tax protesters?

Answer: No. Federal grand juries cannot issue valid indictments against illegal tax protesters. Protest has never been illegal in America, because the <u>First Amendment</u> guarantees our fundamental Right to express our objections to any government actions, in written and in spoken words.

Strictly speaking, the term "illegal" cannot modify the noun "protesters" because to do so would constitute a violation of the $\underline{\text{First Amendment}}$ in the Bill of Rights, one of the most magnificent constitutional provisions ever written.

Accordingly, for the term "illegal tax protester" to survive this obvious constitutional challenge, the term "illegal" must modify the noun "tax". An illegal tax protester is, therefore, someone who is protesting an illegal tax. Such an act of protest is protected by the First Amendment, and cannot be a crime.

Protest is also recognized and honored by the <u>Uniform Commercial Code</u>; the phrases "under protest" and "without prejudice" are sufficient to reserve <u>all</u> of one's fundamental Rights at law. See U.C.C. 1-207 (UCCA $\overline{1207}$ in California).

By the way, the federal U.C.C. is also $\underline{\text{municipal law}}$. See the Answer to $\underline{\text{Question 19}}$ above, and 77 Stat. 630, P.L. 88-243, December 30, 1963 (one month after President John F. Kennedy was murdered).

26. Do IRS agents ever tamper with federal grand juries, and how is this routinely done?

Answer: Yes. IRS agents routinely tamper with federal grand juries, most often by misrepresenting themselves, <u>under oath</u>, as lawful employees and "Special Agents" of the federal government,

and by misrepresenting the provisions of <u>subtitle F</u> as having *any* legal force or effect. Such false representations of fact violate Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, uncodified at 15 U.S.C. 1125 (a). (Title 15 of the United States Code has not been enacted into positive law either.)

They tamper with grand juries by acting as if "income" is everything that "comes in", when there is no such definition anywhere in the IRC. Such false descriptions of fact also violate Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.

They tamper with grand juries by presenting documentary evidence which they had no authority to acquire, in the first instance, such as bank records. Bank signature cards do not constitute competent waivers of their customers' fundamental Rights to privacy, as secured by the Fourth Amendment. The high standard for waivers of fundamental Rights was established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Brady v. U.S., 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).

IRS agents tamper with grand juries by creating <u>and</u> maintaining the false and fraudulent pretenses that the <u>IRC</u> is not vague, or that the income tax provisions have any legal force or effect inside the 50 States of the Union, when those provisions do not.

These are all forms of perjury, as well, and possibly also misprision of perjury by omission, i.e. serious federal offenses.

Finally, there is ample evidence that IRS agents bribe U.S. Attorneys, federal judges, and even the Office of the President with huge <u>kickbacks</u>, every time a criminal indictment is issued by a federal grand jury against an illegal tax protester. (See the Answer to <u>Question 25</u> above.) These kick-backs range from \$25,000 to \$35,000 in CASH! They also violate the <u>Anti-Kickback Act of 1986</u>, which penalizes the payment of kickbacks from federal government subcontractors. See 41 U.S.C. 51 et seq.

As a trust domiciled in <u>Puerto Rico</u>, the IRS is, without a doubt, a federal government subcontractor that is subject to this Act. See <u>31 U.S.C. 1321(a)(62)</u>. The systematic and premeditated pattern of racketeering by IRS employees also establishes probable cause to dismantle the IRS permanently for violating the <u>Sherman Antitrust Act</u>, first enacted in the year 1890 A.D. See <u>26 Stat. 209 (1890) (uncodified at 15 U.S.C. 1 et seq.)</u>

27. What is "The Kickback Racket," and where can I find evidence of its existence?

The evidence of this "kickback racket" was first discovered in a table of delegation orders, on a page within the Internal Revenue Manual ("IRM") -- the internal policy and procedure manual for all IRS employees.

Subsequently, this writer submitted a lawful <u>request</u>, under the <u>Freedom of Information Act</u>, for a certified list of all payments that had ever been made under color of these delegation orders in the IRM. Mr. Mark L. Zolton, a tax law specialist within the Internal Revenue Service, <u>responded</u> on IRS letterhead, transmitted via U.S. Mail, that few records existed for these "awards" because most of them were paid in cash!

When this evidence was properly presented to a federal judge, who had been asked to enforce a federal grand jury subpoena against a small business in Arizona, he ended up obstructing all 28 pieces of U.S. Mail we had transmitted to that grand jury.

Obstruction of correspondence is a serious federal offense, and federal judges have no authority whatsoever to intercept U.S. Mail. See 18 U.S.C. 1702.

Obviously, the federal judge -- <u>John M. Roll</u> -- did NOT want the grand jury in that case to know <u>anything</u> about these kickbacks. They found out anyway, because of the <u>manner</u> in which this writer defended that small business, as its Vice President for Legal Affairs.

28. Can the IRS levy bank accounts without a valid court order?

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Answer: No. The <u>Fifth Amendment</u> prohibits <u>all</u> deprivations of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. *Due Process of Law* is another honored and well developed feature of American constitutional practice. Put simply, it requires Notice and Hearing before *any* property can be seized by any federal government employees, agents, departments or agencies.

A levy against a bank account is a forced seizure of property, *i.e.* the funds on deposit in that account. No such seizure can occur unless due process of law has first run its course. This means notice, hearing, and deliberate adjudication of all the pertinent issues of law and fact.

Only <u>after</u> this process has run its proper or "due" course, can a valid court order be issued. The holding in <u>U.S. v. O'Dell</u>, 160 F.2d 304 (6th Cir. <u>1947</u>), makes it very clear that the IRS can only levy a bank account after first obtaining a Warrant of Distraint, or court ORDER. And, of course, no court ORDER could ever be obtained unless all affected Parties had first enjoyed their "day in court."

29. Do federal income tax revenues pay for any government services and, if so, which government services are funded by federal income taxes?

Answer: No. The money trail is very difficult to follow, in this instance, because the IRS is technically a $\underline{\text{trust}}$ with a

domicile in <u>Puerto Rico</u>. See 31 U.S.C. 1321(a)(62). As such, their records are protected by laws which guarantee the privacy of trust records within that territorial jurisdiction, provided that the trust is not also violating the <u>Sherman Antitrust Act</u>.

They are technically not an "agency" of the federal government, as that term is defined in the <u>Freedom of Information Act</u> and in the <u>Administrative Procedures Act</u>. The governments of the federal territories are expressly excluded from the definition of "agency" in those Acts of Congress. See 5 U.S.C. 551(1)(C). (See also the Answer to Question 5 above.)

All evidence indicates that they are a money laundry, extortion racket, and conspiracy to engage in a pattern of racketeering activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1951 and 1961 et seq.

They appear to be laundering huge sums of money into foreign banks, mostly in Europe, and quite possibly into the Vatican. See the national policy on money laundering at 31 U.S.C. 5341.

The final report of the Grace Commission, convened under President Ronald Reagan, quietly admitted that none of the funds they collect from federal income taxes goes to pay for any federal government services. The Grace Commission found that those funds were being used to pay for interest on the federal debt, and income transfer payments to beneficiaries of entitlement programs like federal pension plans.

30. How can the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") help me to answer other key tax questions?

The availability of correct information about federal government operations is fundamental to maintaining the freedom of the American People. The Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), at $\underline{5}$ $\underline{\text{U.S.C.}}$ $\underline{552}$ et seq., was intended to make government documents available with a minimal amount of effort by the People.

As long as a document is not protected by one of the reasonable exemptions itemized in the \underline{FOIA} , a requester need only submit a brief letter to the agency having custody of the requested document(s). If the requested document is not produced within 20 working days (excluding weekends and federal holidays), the requester need only prepare a single appeal letter.

 If the requested document is not produced within another 20 working days after the date of the appeal letter, the requester is automatically allowed to petition a District Court of the United States (Article III DCUS, not the Article IV USDC) — to compel production of the requested document, and judicially to enjoin the improper withholding of same. See 5 U.S.C. 552 (a) (4) (B). The general rule is that statutes conferring original jurisdiction on federal district courts must be strictly construed.

This writer has pioneered the application of the <u>FOIA</u> to request certified copies of statutes and regulations which should exist, but do not exist. A typical request anyone can make, to which the U.S. Treasury has now fallen totally silent, is for a certified copy of all statutes which create a specific liability for taxes imposed by <u>subtitle A</u> of the IRC. For example, see the FOIA request that this writer prepared for author Lynne Meredith.

Of course, by now we already know the answer to this question, before asking it. (Good lawyers always know the answers to their questions, before asking them.)

It should also be clear that such a FOIA request should <u>not</u> be directed to the IRS, because they are not an "agency" as that term is defined at 5 U.S.C. 551(1)(C). Address it instead to the Disclosure Officer, Disclosure Services, Room 1054-MT, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Washington 20220, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA. This is the format for "foreign" addresses, as explained in USPS Publication #221.

As James Madison once wrote, "A popular government without popular information or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever govern ignorance, and a people who mean to be their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power knowledge gives."

31. Where can I find more information, and still protect my privacy?

There are many civic organizations throughout America who have dedicated their precious time and energy to acquire and disseminate widely these documented truths about the Internal Revenue Service and the Internal Revenue Code.

The Internet's World Wide Web ("www") is perhaps the best single source of information (and disinformation) about the IRS, and the major problems now confirmed in the IRC and in the mountains of related policies, procedures, practices, customs, rules, regulations, forms and schedules.

Learn to become a sophisticated consumer of information, and the knowledge you seek will be yours to keep and share -- with those you love and endeavor to free from this terrible plague that persists in America.

Good luck, and may God bless your earnest endeavors to ensure the blessings of Liberty for ourselves and our Posterity, as stated in the Preamble to the $\underline{\text{U.S.}}$ Constitution and in the Declaration of Independence.

31 Questions and Answers about IRS: Page 20 of 21

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Also, be sure to request information about our MOTIONS FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION to freeze all IRS assets and to enjoin IRS from depositing any tax collections into any account(s) other than the Treasury of the United States. These MOTIONS were filed in two appeals at the Ninth Circuit in San Francisco, using FRAP Rule 8 and the special procedures available to a Private Attorney General under the RICO laws.

Finally, don't miss this opportunity to request more information about our historic APPLICATION FOR ORDER DISSOLVING THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, under a specific authority granted to the District Courts of the United States ("DCUS") at 18 U.S.C. 1964(a). Refer to DCUS docket #SA CV 02-0382 GLT(ANx), Santa Ana, California, or send a blank email message to usintervention@yahoo.com. The vacation autoresponder will respond with a list of Internet folders where several court pleadings and related documents can be found.

VERIFICATION

As the Undersigned, I hereby verify, under penalty of perjury, under the laws of the United States of America, without the "United States" (federal government), that the above statement of facts and laws is true and correct, according to the best of My current information, knowledge, and belief, so help Me God, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1746(1). See the Supremacy Clause for Constitutional authority.

Dated:	February	2	2005	A.D	,
Dacca.					

Signed: Printed:

Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S

Citizen of California, qualified Federal Witness, Private Attorney General, Author of "The Federal Zone:

Cracking the Code of Internal Revenue" (all editions), and Webmaster of the Supreme Law Library:

http://www.supremelaw.org/index.htm

State and Federal Court Cases in Which Certified Copies of 31Q&A Were Entered into Evidence

Meredith et al. v. Erath et al.
Ninth Circuit Appeal No. 01-56873:
http://www.supremelaw.org/cc/meredith2/nad01.htm

Meredith et al. v. Erath et al.
Ninth Circuit Cross-Appeal No. 02-55021:
http://www.supremelaw.org/cc/erath/nad01.htm

People ex rel. Bybee v. Erath et al.
DCUS, Santa Ana, California No. SA-CV-02-0382-GLT(ANx):
http://www.supremelaw.org/cc/giordano/nad01.htm

USA v. Meredith et al.
USDC, Los Angeles, California No. 02-0372:
http://www.supremelaw.org/cc/giordano/nad02.htm

Longner v. Desert Health Trust et al.

USDC, Phoenix, Arizona No. CIV'02-0698-PCT-FJM:
http://www.supremelaw.org/cc/macdonald/nad07.htm

Schmeeckle v. Rose Hills Co., Inc.
Superior Court of California, Santa Ana No. 03NL37156: http://www.supremelaw.org/cc/schmeeckle/complaint.htm

by 2005 MAR 30 A 8: 48 5 Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S. 6 Counselor at Law, Federal Witness 7 and Private Attorney General 8 9 November 7, 2002 A.D. FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE 10 11 Paul H. O'Neill, Secretary of the U.S. San Diego, California. 12 Department of the Treasury in Washington, D.C., has now defaulted by 13 falling silent in the face of a civil SUBPOENA issued by the Article 14 III federal court in Santa Ana, California. 15 The Clerk of that court commanded Secretary O'Neill to produce 16 certified copies of all federal Statutes at Large which create a 17 specific liability for income taxes imposed by subtitle A of the 18 Internal Revenue Code. All Acts of Congress are first published in 19 the Statutes at Large; some are later codified in the U.S. Code. 20 The deadline for complying with the SUBPOENA was midnight on 21 Friday, November 1, 2002 A.D. The SUBPOENA was mailed by this writer 22 on September 14, 2002 A.D. via Registered U.S. Mail from the airport 23 Post Office in San Diego, California, with Return Receipt requested. 24 A courtesy reminder was mailed on October 15, 2002 A.D. 25 The SUBPOENA was issued with detailed directions for delivery of 26 the certified statutes to a list of several litigants and other key 27 players in as many federal and State court cases. The federal cases 28 included proceedings now underway at the U.S. Supreme Court, U.S. 29 Courts of Appeal, and federal district courts. 30 A Florida State case was also listed, because it seeks to nullify 31 four bogus Notices of Federal Tax Lien filed against a retired 32 physician at a County Recorder's office there. 33 The focus of the SUBPOENA has arisen from many years of concerted 34 research and activism to expose the Internal Revenue Code as a massive 35 fiscal fraud upon the American People. 36 Specifically, a key authority from American Jurisprudence, a 37 popular legal encyclopedia, states that an administrative agency may 38 not create any liability not sanctioned by the lawmaking authority, 39 especially a liability for a tax. 2 Am Jur 2d, page 129. 40 This key authority was first discovered when this author was busy 41 answering the enormous volume of correspondence generated by the first 42 edition of "The Federal Zone: Cracking the Code of Internal Revenue." 43 Later editions quoted American Jurisprudence in 44 published in Appendix "P" of that book. Some appendices in "The 45 Federal Zone" are so large, this detail went mostly unnoticed by the 46 Printed copies of "The Federal Zone" are now book's many readers. 47 sold without appendices, in order to reduce shipping bulk. 48 As more evidence accumulated, primarily for purposes of filing 49 affidavits and preparing testimony for State and federal litigation, 50 this author wrote another document entitled "31 Questions and Answers 51 about the Internal Revenue Service," abbreviated "31Q&A". 52 versions of 31Q&A cited the key authority at issue here by reference 53 . to "2 Am Jur 2d, page 129." See the Answer to Question #8 in 31Q&A.

PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Falls Silent

ON FEDERAL TAX REFORM n Face of SUBPOENA for Tax Liability Statutes

1

2

Oddly, 31Q&A readers who bothered to check, later returned to report this citation had been removed from American Jurisprudence.

Now the hunt was on to locate the missing original authority.

This writer scheduled time to approach a professional reference librarian at the downtown law library in San Diego, California. Fortunately, he confirmed that American Jurisprudence had been revised since 1992, and then he succeeded in locating the preceding edition in locked archives at that law library.

It was a moment to remember: Mike says, "Here are those older volumes, Paul. Do you have the exact citation?" Paul says, "Yes. It's 2 Am Jur 2d, page 129." Mike reaches for Volume 2, opens it to page 129, and hands this page to Paul. "Does this look familiar?" Mike asks. "Let me read it to you," answers Paul.

After reading the key authority and the corresponding footnote which cites the case of <u>Commissioner v. Acker</u>, decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1959, Mike replied, "You have a Supreme Court authority there. It doesn't get any better than that!"

It was a quiet moment of triumph for this writer, capping 12 full years of concerted effort -- real blood, sweat and tears -- all required to dismantle the Internal Revenue Service once and for all.

Now that Secretary of the Treasury Paul H. O'Neill has fallen silent in the face of a proper and lawful <u>SUBPOENA IN A CIVIL CASE</u> for the missing liability statutes, the wheels of justice are expected to grind out an unavoidable solution from here on.

Specifically, laws governing the federal courts authorize parties to compel answers to SUBPOENAS, and to move those courts for sanctions such as contempt of court. Recently, another member of President George Bush's cabinet was held in contempt by a federal district court; thus, ample court precedent exists to hold O'Neill in contempt of court -- for not answering. Only time will tell if such contempt proceedings will escalate to the level of a criminal investigation.

On a much broader scale, the absence of liability statutes raises the specter of widespread government fraud, going all the way back to the year 1913. And, there is no statute of limitations on fraud.

The main <u>problem</u> which the <u>SUBPOENA</u> seeks to solve is to confirm, once and for all, the apparent absence of any federal statutes which create a specific liability for income taxes imposed by <u>subtitle A</u> of the Internal Revenue Code.

Even though the federal regulations for IRC section 1 do create a specific liability for federal citizens and for resident aliens, that section of the IRC does not create a specific liability for these two classes of people.

The <u>Acker</u> decision by the U.S. Supreme Court is clear and unequivocal in holding that regulations cannot exceed the underlying statutory authority. See <u>Commissioner v. Acker</u>, 361 U.S. 87 ($\underline{1959}$).

Examples of liability statutes can be found at IRC section $\underline{1461}$ for withholding agents, and section $\underline{3403}$ for federal employment taxes.

Clearly, until withholding agents remit the taxes they have withheld, they are made specifically liable for those taxes by section $\frac{1461}{1}$. Likewise, the Public Salary Tax Act creates a specific $\frac{1}{1}$ liability for taxes imposed upon the privilege of employment with the federal government.

These legal details are explained clearly in 310&A.

The absence of any statutes creating a specific liability for $\underline{\text{subtitle A}}$ income taxes means, quite simply, that federal income taxes are totally and completely $\underline{\text{voluntary}}$, in the common everyday meaning of that term. Liability only begins when Form 1040 is signed.

Further stunning proof that these taxes are truly voluntary can be found at IRC section $3402\,(n)$. Here, Congress has authorized a form called the "withholding exemption certificate" abbreviated "WEC". The term "withholding exemption certificate" occurs a total of seventeen (17) times in that one statute alone.

However, the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") has never created an official form for the WEC.

Making matters much worse, it is now becoming painfully clear that all federal judges are material witnesses to the practice of concealing the withholding exemption certificate from them, when they were first hired by the federal judiciary.

Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist has openly <u>admitted</u>, to a class of law students at the University of Arizona, that <u>all</u> federal judges are currently paying taxes on their pay, without exception.

If federal judges are material witnesses to the subject matter before them, such as federal taxes, the statute at 28 U.S.C. 455 expressly prohibits them from presiding on all such cases. Federal judges are also immune from taxation on their pay, by constitutional mandate. See Article III, Section 1, in the U.S. Constitution.

The implications of this conflict of interest are quite farreaching, touching as they do literally thousands of court cases which have been decided by federal judges whose compensations have been diminished, contrary to the fundamental Law in our <u>Constitution</u>. Again, further details are fully explained in <u>310&A</u>.

<u>Paul Andrew Mitchell</u> encourages all Americans to read the on-line version of 310&A, and to follow the numerous working hyperlinks to the mountain of supporting evidence, at Internet URL:

http://www.supremelaw.org/sls/31answers.htm

Certified and embossed copies of 31Q&A are available from the <u>Supreme Law Firm</u> for \$30. A <u>referral program</u> also makes it possible for buyers to get their money back, and to make a little profit too, by referring others to this immensely important document.

The <u>SUBPOENA</u>, <u>PROOF OF SERVICE</u>, and <u>Delivery Instructions</u> can be accessed at Internet URL:

http://www.supremelaw.org/cc/eddings/subpoena.liability.htm

The .gif files (Graphics Interchange Format) were output by a modern scanner. These can be enlarged or reduced by using the IMAGING program at START | PROGRAMS | ACCESSORIES in Microsoft Windows 98.

Alternatively, right click on a .gif file, then SAVE AS to your local hard disk, for viewing with any of a number of graphics programs that now abound for computers with Microsoft Windows software.

Image resizing is also automatic with Microsoft Internet Explorer version 6.0.2600+. Click on Tools | Internet Options | Advanced, scroll down to "Multimedia", then "Enable Automatic Image Resizing".

Progress with SUBPOENA enforcement will be reported at the Supreme Law Library. See the Update Highlights at supremelaw.org.

2 <u>Am Jur 2d</u>, page 129 (1962) Administrative Law

Section 301. -- Particular applications.

In application of the principles that the power of an administrative agency to make rules does not extend to the power to make legislation and that a regulation which is beyond the power of the agency to make is invalid, it has been held that an administrative agency may not create a criminal offense or any liability not sanctioned by the lawmaking authority, and specifically a liability for a tax [fn 2] or inspection fee. [bold emphasis added]

Footnote 2:

2. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Acker, 361 U.S. 87, 4 L.Ed.2d 127, 80 S.Ct. 144 (1959); Roberts v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 176 F.2d 221, 10 ALR.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1949) (... regulations "can add nothing to income as defined by Congress." citing M.E. Blatt Co. v. United States, 305 U.S. 267, 279, 59 S.Ct. 186, 190, 83 L.Ed. 167 (1938)); Independent Petroleum Corp. v. Fly, 141 F.2d 189, 152 ALR 928 (5th Cir. 1944) (... the power to make regulations does not extend to making taxpayers of those whom the Act, properly construed, does not tax); Indiana Dept. of State Revenue v. Colpaert Realty Corp., 231 Ind. 463, 109 NE.2d 415 (no power to render taxable a transaction which the statute did not make taxable); Morrison-Knudsen Co. v. State Tax Com., 242 Iowa 33, 44 NW.2d 449, 41 ALR.2d 523 (use tax).

Liability for the payment of the sales tax is controlled by statute; it cannot be controlled by rulings or regulations of the board. Acorn Iron Works v. State Board of Tax Administration, 295 Mich. 143, 294 NW 126, 139 ALR 368. Annotation: 139 ALR 380 ("retail sale").

District Court of the United States

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFOR	NIA
Tally H. Eddings	
SURPOENA	IN A CIVIL CASE
- · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	1-CV-1299-ORL-28DA
LAUR RACIELL CI WI.	.(1)
Middle	e District of Florida
TO: Hon. Paul H. O'Neill, Secretary of 1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. Washington 20220 DISTRICT	The Treasury
1300 Pennsylvania Pivenue, N.	OF COLUMBIA USA
YOU ARE COMMANDED to appear in the United States District Court at the	e place, date, and time specified below to
testify in the above case.	
PLACE OF TESTIMONY	COURTROOM
PAST DUE	
INDIDOL	DATE AND TIME
YOU ARE COMMANDED to appear at the place, date, and time specified bein the above case.	low to testify at the taking of a deposition
PLACE OF DEPOSITION	DATE AND TIME
YOU ARE COMMANDED to produce and permit inspection and copying of place, date, and time specified below (list documents or objects): See arrached Directions for Descriptions	the following documents or objects at the
	DATE AND TIME
See arrached (2 pages).	Nov. 1, 2002 A.D.
YOU ARE COMMANDED to permit inspection of the following premises at	the date and time specified below.
PREMISES	DATE AND TIME
Any organization not a party to this suit that is subpoenaed for the taking of a deposition sho	all designate one or more officers, directors, or
managing agents, or other persons who consent to testify on its behalf, and may set forth which the person will testify. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 30(b)(6).	n, for each person designated, the matters on
SHERRICARTER CLERK ISSUING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE AND TITLE (INDICATE IF ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF OR DEFENDANT) BY:	DATE 9/14/2002 A
	1/1/2000
SANTA ANA, CA 92701	PM -
(714) 338-4750	· ',' C
(11)000 1100	

1		Directions for Delivery of Following Documer Commanded by Attached SUBPOENA IN A CIVIL CA	
2 3		Commanded by Attached Sobrobna in A Civil Cr	101
4	Cert	ified copies of all enacted Statutes at Large v	which create a
5	spec	ific liability for federal income taxes imposed by	subtitle A of
6		Internal Revenue Code, filed with PROOFS OF SERVICE	
7	foll	owing mailing destinations, in quantities shown in p	arentheses:
8	(1)	D. Malla II Daldings II M D	(1x)
9 10	(1)	Dr. Tally H. Eddings, II, M.D. 187 Semoran Boulevard	(1 x)
11		Fern Park 32730	
12		FLORIDA, USA	
13			
14	(2)	Dr. John C. Alden, M.D.	(1x)
15		350 - 30 th Street, Suite 444	
16		Oakland 94609-3426	
17		CALIFORNIA, USA	
18 19	(3)	Case No. 6:01-CV-1299-ORL-28DAB	(3x)
20	(3)	Tally H. Eddings v. Four Records, etc. et al.	(/
21		Attention: Sheryl L. Loesch, Clerk of Court	
22		United States District Court	
23		Middle District of Florida	
24		George C. Young U.S. Courthouse	
25		and Federal Building	
26		80 North Hughey Avenue Orlando 32801	
27 28		FLORIDA, USA	
29		THORIDA, ODA	
30	(4)	Appeal No. 01-56873	(5x)
31		Meredith et al. v. Erath et al.	
32		Attention: Cathy A. Catterson, Clerk of Court	
33		U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit	
34		P.O. Box 193939 San Francisco 94119-3939	
35 36		CALIFORNIA, USA	
37		CALIFORNIA, USA	
38	(5)	Cross-Appeal No. 02-55021	(5x)
39	` ,	Meredith et al. v. Erath et al.	
40		Attention: Cathy A. Catterson, Clerk of Court	
41		U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit	
42		P.O. Box 193939	
43 44		San Francisco 94119-3939 CALIFORNIA, USA	
45		CALIFORNIA, OSA	
46	(6)	Case No. SA-CV-02-0382-GLT(ANx)	(3x)
47	, -,	People ex rel. Bybee et al. v. Erath et al.	
48		Attention: Sherri Carter, Clerk of Court	
49		District Court of the United States	
50 ·		Central Judicial District of California	
51 52		Southern Division 411 West Fourth Street, Room 1-053	
5∠ 53		Santa Ana 92701-4516	
54		CALIFORNIA, USA	
		•	

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	(7)	Case No. CR-02-00372-DDP <u>USA v. Meredith et al.</u> Attention: Clerk of Court United States District Court Central District of California Western Division 312 North Spring Street, Room G-8 Los Angeles 90012-4797 CALIFORNIA, USA	(3x)
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	(8)	Case No. CV-02-04242-DDP(Mcx) People ex rel. Bybee et al. v. Erath et al. Attention: Clerk of Court United States District Court Central District of California Western Division 312 North Spring Street, Room G-8 Los Angeles 90012-4797 CALIFORNIA, USA	(3x)
21 22 23 24 25 26 27	(9)	Mr. Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S. Private Attorney General c/o Dr. John C. Alden, M.D. 350 - 30 th Street, Suite 444 Oakland 94609-3426 CALIFORNIA, USA	(1x)
28 29 30 31 32 33	(10)	Mr. Terry Eugene Busby, Petitioner Busby v. Internal Revenue Service U.S. Supreme Court No. 02-5017 c/o 4875 New Tampa Highway Lakeland 33815 FLORIDA, USA	(1x)
35 36 37 38 39 40 41		Office of the Solicitor General In re: Busby v. Internal Revenue Service U.S. Supreme Court No. 02-5017 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Room 5614 Washington 20530-0001 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA	(1x)
42 43 44 45 46 47	(12)	Office of the Chief Counsel Internal Revenue Service 1111 Constitution Avenue, N.W. Washington 20224 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA	(1x)
48 49 50 51 52 53	(13)	Case No. 05-2001-CA-006449-XXXX-XX Tally H. Eddings v. Four Records, etc. et al. Attention: Clerk of Court, Brevard County Eighteenth Judicial Circuit Court of Florida P.O. Box 2767 Titusville 32781 FLORIDA, USA	(3x)

PROOF	OF SERVICE
SERVED Sept. 14, 2002 A.D.	1500 Pennsylvania Ave. N.W. Washington 20220 D.C.
	MANNER OF SERVICE J Registered U.S. Mail Serial #RB773293857US
Paul Andrew Mirchell	Private Attorney General (see 18 U.S.C. 11964)
DECLARA	TION OF SERVER
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the Proof of Service is true and correct. Executed on 9/14/2002 A.D.	United States of America that the foregoing information contained in the

Rule 45, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Parts C & D:

(c) PROTECTION OF PERSONS SUBJECT TO SUBPOENAS.

- (1) A party or an attorney responsible for the issuance and service of a subpoena shall take reasonable steps to avoid imposing undue burden or expense on a person subject to that subpoena. The court on behalf of which the subpoena was issued shall enforce this duty and impose upon the party or attorney in breach of this duty an appropriate sanction which may include, but is not limited to, lost earnings and reasonable attorney's fee.
- (2) (A) A person commanded to produce and permit inspection and copying of designated books, papers, documents or tangible things, or inspection of premises need not appear in person at the place of production or inspection unless commanded to appear for deposition, hearing or trial.
- (B) Subject to paragraph (d) (2) of this rule, a person commanded to produce and permit inspection and copying may, within 14 days after service of subpoena or before the time specified for compliance if such time is less than 14 days after service, serve upon the party or attorney designated in the subpoena written objection to inspection or copying of any or all of the designated materials or of the premises. If objection is made, the party serving the subpoena shall not be entitled to inspect and copy materials or inspect the premises except pursuant to an order of the court by which the subpoena was issued. If objection has been made, the party serving the subpoena may, upon notice to the person commanded to produce, move at any time for an order to compel the production. Such an order to comply production shall protect any person who is not a party or an officer of a party from significant expense resulting from the inspection and copying commanded.
- (3) (A) On timely motion, the court by which a subpoena was issued shall quash or modify the subpoena if it
 - (i) fails to allow reasonable time for compliance,
- (ii) requires a person who is not a party or an officer of a party to travel to a place more than 100 miles from the place where that person resides, is employed or regularly transacts business in person, except that, subject to the provisions of clause (c) (3) (B) (iii) of this rule, such a person may in order to

attend trial be commanded to travel from any such place within the state in which the trial is held, or the demanding party to contest the claim.

- (iii) requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter and no exception or waiver applies, or
 - (iv) subjects a person to undue burden.
 - (B) If a subpoena
- (i) requires disclosure of a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial information, or
- (ii) requires disclosure of an unretained expert's opinion or information not describing specific events or occurrences in dispute and resulting from the expert's study made not at the request of any party, or
- (iii) requires a person who is not a party or an officer of a party to incur substantial expense to travel more than 100 miles to attend trial, the court may, to protect a person subject to or affected by the subpoena, quash or modify the subpoena, or, if the party in who behalf the subpoena is issued shows a substantial need for the testimony or material that cannot be otherwise met without undue hardship and assures that the person to whom the subpoena is addressed will be reasonably compensated, the court may order appearance or production only upon specified conditions.

(d) DUTIES IN RESPONDING TO SUBPOENA.

- (1) A person responding to a subpoena to produce documents shall produce them as they are kept in the usual course of business or shall organize and label them to correspond with the categories in the demand.
- (2) When information subject to a subpoena is withheld on a claim that it is privileged or subject to protection as trial preparation materials, the claim shall be made expressly and shall be supported by a description of the nature of the documents, communications, or things not produced that is sufficient to enable the demanding party to contest the claim.

MIDWAY WINDOWS SAN DIEGO, California 921109998

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Product Description	- Sales Sale Qty	Receipt - Unit Price	Final Price
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First-Class Return Rece Registered Insured Va Article Va	ipt lue :		\$1.75 \$7.50 \$0.00 \$0.00
Label Seri \$5.00 Stamp 29c Stamp 2c Stamp	al #: R	\$77329305 \$5.00 \$0.29 \$0.02	\$10.00 \$0.29 \$0.02
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 Complete items 1, 2, and 3. Also complete item 4 if Restricted Delivery is desired. Print your name and address on the reverse so that we can return the card to you. Attach this card to the back of the mailpiece, or on the front if space permits. Article Addressed to: Hon Paul H. O'Neill Secretary of the Treasury 1500 Pennsylvania Av. NW 	A. Signature X M Sumon
Washington 20220 DISTRICT OF COUMBIA	3. Service Type Certified Mail Registered Return Receipt for Merchandise Insured Mail C.O.D. 4. Restricted Delivery? (Extra Fee)
Article Number (Transfer from service label)	
PS Form 3811, August 2001 Domestic Ret	urn Receipt 102595-02-M-103



COURTESY REMINDER Hon. Paul H. O'Neill TO: Secretary of the Treasury PAST DUE 1500 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington 20220 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, USA FROM: Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.

Private Attorney General, 18 U.S.C. 1964(a)

. . . .

DATE: October 15, 2002 A.D.

SUBJECT: SUBPOENA IN A CIVIL CASE dated 9/14/2002 A.D.

answer due on November 1, 2002 A.D.

Greetings Secretary O'Neill:

We are writing to provide you with the following courtesy notice.

We do remind you that you have been commanded by the Clerk of the Article III District Court of the United States ("DCUS"), Central District of California, to produce the documents that were itemized in the Directions for Delivery attached to that SUBPOENA.

We posted the original of that $\underline{\text{SUBPOENA}}$ on September 14, 2002 A.D. via Registered U.S. Mail, serial number $\frac{\#\text{RB773293057US}}{\#\text{RB773293057US}}$, at Midway Station in San Diego 92110-9998, CALIFORNIA, USA, with Return Receipt requested (see enclosed).

Copies of the completed USPS Form 3811 ("green card"), signed by one "M Simon" on 9/20/02, and of our PROOF OF SERVICE of said SUBPOENA, are also enclosed for your information.

The stated deadline for your specific compliance with said SUBPOENA is November 1, 2002 A.D. (approximately two (2) weeks hence).

Please be advised that, if you fall silent in the response to this lawful and valid command, now issued by the Clerk of the federal district court in Santa Ana, California, we will move the appropriate federal court to *compel* an answer from you.

We also reserve our fundamental Right to petition one or more federal courts for an ORDER holding you in contempt of court, in the event that you elect to fall silent. See the Petition Clause in the $\underline{\text{First}}$ Amendment, for constitutional authority.

The federal courts (and cases) in question have already been itemized in our Directions for Delivery (see copies enclosed).

Mr. Secretary O'Neill, thank you very much for your timely and professional consideration.

1	Sincerely yours,
2	
3	/s/ Paul Andrew Mitchell
4	
5	Paul Andrew Mitchell, B.A., M.S.
6	Private Attorney General, 18 U.S.C. 1964(a)
7	
8	http://www.supremelaw.org/decs/agency/private.attorney.general.htm
9	
10	All Rights Reserved without Prejudice
11	
12	copies: Dr. Tally H. Eddings, II, M.D., Fern Park, Florida
13	Dr. John C. Alden, M.D., Oakland, California
14	Rep. Ron Paul, Member, U.S. House of Representatives
15	Judge Alex Kozinski, Ninth Circuit (supervising)
16	Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Supreme Court (supervising)
17	Office of the President, The White House, Washington, D.C.
18	
19	attachments